humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Mar 7, 5:48 pm, Malrassic Park wrote:
[snip-id-ee-doo-dah]
> "Brick" is a concept of an object, you cannot 'eave a concept
> at a stranger, at least not physically.

And so another Malvalanche begins.

Bricks are objects. I was talking about "brickness" and you
claimed that "brickness" was identical to all bricks. I pointed
out, in what appears to have been too sublte a manner for you,
that you were being foolish.

> So what you're really asking me for, I think, is the referents of
> universals. But they are all concepts of method. Concepts of
> method have no referents. I have stated previously that
> metaphysical concepts are entirely concepts of method. They
> are concepts whose only function is to unite the class.

Sigh. Now you get 10 minutes for Kanting. And you are
very close to getting a game misconduct.

Concepts of methods have no referents? That's priceless.

No, Mal, I was mocking you for claiming that universals
were identical to all members of the class. You didn't seem
to notice. But, as I said, philosophers have not really got
to grips with these notions. Whereas computer scientists
have done so and beat them to death.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liskov_substitution_principle

> When you complain about finding properties for those members
> of the class "things I'm thinking about," you should be directing
> your complaints at Ayn Rand.

But I didn't complain about finding properties for that class.
I complained that you hadn't considered that class when you
tried to make universals identical to the members of a class.
And since the properties that get a thing into that class are
not properties of the things, it is pretty silly of you.

> Things you're thinking about share the same properties, or you
> wouldn't be able to classify them as you did.

Heh heh. Mal, you now are not only a mind reader, but you
are telling me there are only certain ways I can classify things.

Geeze, Mal, didn't you study set theory in school?

> I don't have to
> worry about the problem of measurement-omission whereas
> Rand had to make everything conceptual fit that scheme.

Rand's sins don't save you from yours. I have not yet gotten
to measurement-omission. You fail at building a house.

> The things you're thinking about share the common property of
> being thoughts about things.

No, the things I'm thinking about are not thoughts. The
thoughts are what I'm thinking about them *with* not the
things.
Socks