humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Mar 8, 3:31 pm, Jim Klein wrote:
> On Mar 7, 11:17 am, Malrassic Park wrote:
>
> > Here's the reasoning: it is only on the basis of universals that it is
> > possible to form a class at all. It is possible only on the basis of
> > finding identicals, not similarities.
>
> Except for measurement-omission. That makes it possible.

I see where you explained that statement below.

> > Rand's theory of similarities
> > cannot therefore answer the problem of universals even as she stated
> > it as three men who may not possess a single identical characteristic.
>
> > Rand was somehow aware that identicals are necessary to solving the
> > problem, but similarities are not identicals. A property is an
> > attribute shared by all members of a class, but that is not good
> > enough to form the universal. The property must also be identical for
> > all members, therefore it is a universal.
>
> The property itself need not be identical, just our distillation of
> some aspect, or part, of the property...like redness.

You seem to contradict yourself just below this, but it's hard to say
in the absence of definition.

When I'm talking about a property (in accordance with the Princeton
definition), it is the same property for all members of the class,
whether that property is redness or some other. Property is a class
concept.

Of course someone will point the finger and proclaim that I used it
incorrectly here or there. But that is just being petty.

> > But the color red, as a property, is not identical for all members, as
> > red shades differ from entity to entity and no two red shades are
> > exactly alike.
>
> No, but with measurement-omission, what's left /is/ identical for each
> member.

what's left over after omitting measurements from the sensation of
red?

> > Therefore *the mind* has to create the identicals, the
> > mind has to form universals out of properties. It does this by forming
> > the universal "redness" based partially on experiences with red
> > entities and partially from products of reason itself. Reason produces
> > the non-empirical metaphysical concepts, not garnerable from the
> > empirical, to be used in this process which enable the establishment
> > of universals and thus the formation of a class. It is first necessary
> > to establish the universals, and this process bridges the gap between
> > metaphysics and epistemology.
>
> I wouldn't call that crazy, but it's needlessly complex. Measurement-
> omission accomplishes the same feat, and seems tons simpler.

Measurement-omission is a petitio, based in percept-formation
which is a petitio, based in the validity of the senses which is a
petitio, based in "existence exists" which is a petitio. Any assumed
premise is a petitio, and all of those premises are assumed.

> > Class-formation is an intellectual process. It is not psychological,
> > or even neurological.
>
> I can't imagine what you might mean by this. Not neurological?
> What's doing the action then?

Are you a materialist? I don't need to rely on any neurology. If
thinking is an action, and if you say it is an effect of brain
activity, then it is really just brain activity. And so I don't
see what Rand's theory of concept-formation was for, all she had
to do is wait for neurologists to tell her what concepts are and
how they are formed by the brain. I don't see why Rand gets a
bye on this question but not me, since only a tiny portion of
her entire book had anything to do with neurology, and that did
notinvolve concept-formation.

And look at what she accomplished with her little jaunt into
the neurological realm (with her reference to "brain.") - a
word-salad in which she tried to have Direct Realism based
in Indirect Realism in which consciousness is given
via percept constructed from sensations, instead of being
given simply via perception itself.

So I must ask you, based on a statement you made at the
end: who formed a theory based in needless and contrived
complexity? Rand with her needless and contrived
theory/word-salad of perception, or yours truly?

> > It is not necessary to appeal to the brain or to
> > methods of concept-formation borrowed from cog. sci. Of course we
> > form classes out of entities or some other empirical content. But the
> > process is not based in the entities themselves, it cannot be since
> > these entities exemplify only difference and variety.
.
> The process may not be based in the entities themselves, but it can
> surely be based /because/ of the entities themselves...that combined
> with whatever neurological processes are going on.

"Based because of" is meaningless because the word "based"
is left hanging without a proper object. I don't think it's
necessary to invent new grammatical forms here, nor did I invent
any new words. I base my terminology on Princeton U definitions,
Rand's concepts (where I say she got it right), Aristotle, and some
Kant.

> > They can however
> > be "brought together" on the basis of common properties which are
> > held to be, not merely similar, but identical, as in Rand's question
> > of the three men. These identicals are formable only through an
> > intellectual activity, not through empirical evidence, and only then
> > on the basis of metaphysical postulates which are true universally for
> > all possible classes because they are the basis for the very formation
> > of any class you can devise.
>
> What are you talking about? You don't need any postulates to come
> up with an identical property among somewhat varying objects, using
> measurement-omission. Clearly we do it all the time..."That's a
> building."

"That's a building" has nothing to do with what I was talking about.

Do you think that "class" as in things being classed together is
a valid concept? Do you think the definition of "class" I found
at the Princeton U website is wrong?

If not, what kind of concept is it? Is it a concept of method or a
concept of consciousness? Where does it belong in epistemological
theory? Where does "category" belong in such a theory and how
is it related to "class" and "concept"?

Those are the kinds of question I would expect from an introduction
to epistemology, not concept-formation which should come later.
Otherwise, it is just begging the question.

> Saying that the claim is true might take some postulates or axioms,
> like
> that A is A, or even the reliability of the senses which is a
> postulate in
> this context, but not an axiomatic postulate.
>
> > Class-formation requires Unity, in the midst of a world which brings
> > us only plurality and diversity; Necessity, in the midst of a world
> > which brings us only contingency; and Substantiality, in the midst of
> > a world which brings us only appearance.
>
> I thought the world brings itself; "appearance" is what happens after
> we interact with, or sense, it.

It is appearance, until the intellect, the mind, gives it substance.
'Substance' is one of those metaphysical concepts of method,
a universal applying to all possible appearances.

Appearance is pre-intellectual perception, but it is not a percept
because I don't have any use for a theory of percepts or
percept-formation, only perception. Even if neurology proves there
is a "thing" in the brain known as a percept, my theory doesn't
require it, and Rand's would have been better off without it. Notice
the word-salad on page 5 which resulted from Rand trying to mix
science with philosophy.

What I need is a theory of the intellect, which is not a theory
of concepts. A theory of concepts and concept-formation must
be derived from the intellectual realm, that is, from a theory
of epistemology. When I say "intellect," I mean "reason" in the
proper sense of the word, which is the faculty that communicates
by means of metaphysical concepts, such as Unity, Being, and
Substance.

> Like I said...not a crazy theory, but worthy of rejection based on
> needless and contrived complexity.

Oh well, at this point I'll take "not a crazy theory" as a compliment,
even if the criticism was unhelpful due to rhetorically loaded words
such as "needless" and "contrived."

> Do you really think a lower animal can't
> distinguish a man from a lion because it's not able to do all this
> advanced conceptualizing that you say is going on? It doesn't seem
> to be that way; it seems that even lower animals are able to distill
> out common aspects of perceptual scenes. What they aren't able
> to do, is abstractly conceptualize those distillations with something
> that itself is perceivable, like a phoneme.

Animals do have some logical capabilities. A kitten playing with a
ball of yarn bats it behind a door, and even though it is not in its
perceptual range, because the kitten can't see or even smell it, it
infers that the ball of yarn is there.

That kitten obviously has no concepts, not even implicit ones, and
that is one reason why I have to distinguish the intellectual from
the conceptual. The kitten has a rudimentary form of intellect, just
not a conceptual one.

If you discard the word "intellect" then you also toss away the word
"intelligent." If kittens show intelligence, it is because they
possess some limited form of inference ability. It is humans who need
metaphysical concepts, whose intellect is of the conceptual form
which vastly frees the mind from the limits of perception or even
inference. This freedom is available only on metaphysical grounds,
that is, the universals. Our metaphysical concepts were invented by
the ancient Greeks based on asking questions about the universe,
and their answers are now, not only part of our cultural, but part of
each person's intellectual identity which is reason.

It is by means of the presence of these universals in reason that we
come to know, not just find, the manness in men. Our form of
reasoning is not "rational" (a tautology), it is metaphysical.

--
We usually go over the top w/ our new found freedoms.
Unfortunately, her 'followers' are as radical as Pat
Robertson's. Discernment goes out the window.
- A youtube poster