humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Sat, 08 Mar 2008 17:21:09 -0800, Fred Weiss
wrote:

>On Mar 8, 6:24 pm, Malrassic Park wrote:
>> On Mar 8, 1:41 pm, Fred Weiss wrote:
>
>> > > So what you're really asking me for, I think, is the referents of
>> > > universals. But they are all concepts of method.
>>
>> > Methods pertaining to what?
>>
>> Solving problems, which is exactly how Rand explained it.
>
>Solving problems about what?

ITOE, pp 35-36
'A special sub-category of concepts pertaining to the products of
consciousness, is reserved for concepts of method. Concepts of method
designate systematic courses of action devised by men for the purpose
of achieving certain goals. The course of action may be purely
psychological (such as a method of using one's consciousness) or it
may involve a combination of psychological and physical actions
(such as a method of drilling for oil), according to the goal to be
achieved.'

>> > > Concepts of method have no referents.
>>
>> > It would be interesting to watch Mal teach grammar (for example)
>> > without providing any examples of what he is talking about.
>>
>> "Infinity" is a concept of method for mathematicians. It has no
>> correspondence in objects of perception.
>
>Not a particular object of perception, of course. You can't point to
>an "infinity". But that's very different from suggesting, as you are
>here, that these concepts (of method) have no basis in reality.

According to the quote above, the concept of method has its basis in
human purpose. They may be psychological or physical goals.

Since Rand had never defined "a-ness" or "manness" or even "redness,"
someone has to step up to the plate.

Universals such as those have their purpose in consciousness, in the
formation of a class which is an intellectual construct. They are
concepts of method for the purpose of forming classes.

>In any case, it was certainly not her view that all "universals" (I
>assume by that you mean "concepts") are all concepts of method and
>have no referents in perception. That was the original pronouncement
>of yours to which I was responding.
.
>She makes this all quite clear in Chap. 4 of ITOE, "Concepts of
>Consciousness", ie. what she considers concepts of method as compared
>to other kinds of concepts - concepts of method being a sub-category
>of concepts of consciousness.

I have to use the word "universals" in order to specify a class of
concepts. I am not talking about "red," I am talking about "redness";
I am not talking about "man," I am talking about "manness."

'Red' has a referent in perception, it refers to the sensation of the
color red. 'Redness' has no such referent in perception, it refers to
that property which is identical throughout the class of red entities.
A property of a class does not exist in perception, a class of red
entities does not exist in perception (neither does a concept), these
are intellectual constructs. A concept is also an intellectual
construct. A universal, as a type of concept, is an intellectual
construct.

I am not neglecting the material of the senses in the construction of
most classes, only when necessary. We know 'redness' partly because
of red objects in perception, and partly because of methodological
"devices" that do not derive from perception, but inwardly from the
mind (which is just as real as anything in perception considered
substantially).

Everything that exists has properties; so does the mind. The mind's
properties are metaphysical. These universals are not found in some
Platonic dimension, they are not found in Aristotle's entities, they
are not found in Rand's method of concept-formation. These universals
are properties of human nature qua intellectual.

Where does the universal, metaphysical concept Necessity come
from, when we are surrounded by contingency? It comes from a real
entity with real needs and real functions: it comes from the mind. It
comes from human nature qua intellectual. One could say that it is a
property of the intellectual part of the mind. The mind needs to
classify and conceptualize things. In order to do so, it must create
universals identical throughout particular classes, but moreover, it
must create the universals identical to all classes in general, that
is the formation of the class of all classes which is the realm of
metaphysics, because their only intellectual function is to create
classes out of entities. Thus all entities, qua existing, can be
classifed in terms of metaphysical properties considered to be held in
common universally.

Perception does not bring Unity to the formation of any and every
class considered as a unit; perception does not bring Substance to
the formation of any class of entities considered to be real. To the
contrary, perception brings just the opposite. These universals are
brought to perception in the formation of classes out of the material
of the senses. Some of these classes are formed into concepts as the
need arises. But if there is any reality to the idea of an "implicit
concept," it would probably be found in the idea of classes.
--
We usually go over the top w/ our new found freedoms.
Unfortunately, her 'followers' are as radical as Pat
Robertson's. Discernment goes out the window.
- A youtube poster