On Feb 28, 8:36 am, Gordon Sollars
> In article <47C65E93.3070...@cox.net>, vonve...@cox.net says...
>
> > Gordon Sollars wrote:
> > > In article <47C5120E.1070...@cox.net>, vonve...@cox.net says...
> > >> Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
> > > Yes, he can, insofar as "holding to the duty" is measured by the actions
> > > that he takes.
>
> > He can only in your fantasies because as you assert, there is no duty to
> > be measured against, remember?
>
> There is no duty, but there is a description for the actions to be
> measured against.
And yet you have said:
"You are presumed to know that a right has a correlative duty."
And you once said: "The /most/ common usage probably conflates
obligation and duty. But my ethics professor many years ago taught me
that obligations were constraints voluntarily assumed, while duties
where constraints that held regardless." [And the ethics prof was not
an Objectivist.]
And then you say:
Of course he can [hold to "duty" which does not exist], he could be
mistaken, thinking that it did exist.
You have said: "Rights limit the permissible freedom of others."
I ask: by what power?
You say: "A right is not a power."
Really? Then how is something limiting something else?
It just does.
"Duty" is an anti-concept that neatly wraps up rights as a way to
limit or permit freedom.
. . . but you say: duty does not exist but rather is "action to be
measured against."
So . . . Is the limitation on permissable freedom is brought into
existence by an action to be measured against or is it just "is" ?
> Thus, if a person says that he prays because there is
> a duty to pray to God,
Who says there is a duty to pray to God? Oh, this hypothetical guy
does.
>we can "measure his actions" by looking to see if
> he prays or not.
All you have said is that based on the premise that someone says there
is a duty to pray to God, this person who prays to God is doing his
duty. I ask what about this premise there is a duty to pray to God,
let alone the premise of God? To you, I guess none of that matters.
I don't whether this is solipsism or subjectivism, but it is certainly
sophistry.