humanities.philosophy.objectivism

In article @e60g2000hsh.googlegroups.com>, cbell97@bellsouth.net says...
> On Feb 27, 8:19 pm, Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
> > She clearly rejects the *concept* of positive rights (VOS, p96).  I am
> > not holding her to any distinction that she does not make herself,
> > however it might be labeled.
> >
>
> She rejects the concept of what is the progressive liberal positive
> right.

That's what I said. When you concede a point, you should be clear about
it.

> She herself does not use the terms "negative" or "positive"
> right in the classical liberal or any other sense except for the very
> sentence before your favorite quote:
>
> "Thus, for every individual, a right is the moral SANCTION OF A
> POSITIVE -- of his freedom to act on his own judgment, for his own
> goals, by his own voluntary, uncoerced choice."
>
> in contrast to the sentence following it:
>
> "As to his neighbors, his rights impose no obligations on them except
> of a negative kind: to abstain from violating his rights."
>
> This is what so confused you when I put Rand's concept of rights and
> obligations in context and CONTRASTED the right to life (first
> sentence) to the political right of obligations of a negative kind
> (second sentence) as one of positive rights versus negative rights.

Again, you make no sense: "the political right of obligations of a
negative kind". What does the "right to" an obligation mean here? The
"sanction of a positive" refers to the approval of positive action,
which man must take to preserve his life. Note that you inject the term
"political", yet Rand does not use it to modify "right" in these
passages - still less does she use your "political-legal" portmanteau.
There is no basis for "contrasting" 'right' in the the first sentence
with 'right' in the second - except, perhaps, the theory you've
convinced yourself of in the face of the evidence.


> This is to say, again, that the right to life overrides any political
> right, which, at its fundamental meaning, is only a right to do
> nothing. The contrast is not just of "positive" versus "negative" but
> one of "moral" versus "political" rights -- something else about which
> you show great confusion.

I'll be polite and say that this is a charming story, but it bears no
relation to the text from the bottom of page 93 to the top of page 94.
She refers to "moral principle" and "moral sanction"; no mention is made
of the word "political".
...
> She says his moral rights, and any derivative political rights, cannot
> make anybody do anything he does not want to do.

Once again, you weasel out of giving any references, but in this case it
doesn't matter. As I have said repeatedly, a right is not a power, so
of course one's right cannot, by itself, "make anybody do anything he
does not want to do". My argument has no problem if Rand asserts this -
I assert it as well.

> She says that no political right can impose on any moral right unless
> that political right is chosen and only then in the context in which
> it is chosen [i.e., politics-government-law may impose a military
> draft but that draft is a violation of the moral right to be free of
> unchosen obligations.]

Again, your conclusory statements are worthless, given your penchant for
misquoting. Give references or give up.
...
> > Not at all.  I am recognizing that Rand rejected unchosen positive
> > obligations while endorsing that rights imply a negative obligation.
>
>
> Rand never said to reject unchosen positive obligations. She said to
> reject unchosen obligations. She "endorsed" any political right that
> implies no unchosen obligations, and the political right, once chosen,
> of itself means the right to do nothing to/by/for anyone without his
> consent. An obligation of a negative kind is this obligation to do
> nothing, absent consent. If you do not like this interpretation of
> Rand's words,

It's not that I don't like it, it's that it is a confused garble. What
you should do with a "to/by/for" is hit yourself in the head with it to
see if it will knock some sense into you. An obligation of a negative
kind in this context is an obligation not to interfere with the right of
another.

> I ask that you find any textual evidence that Rand must
> have meant something else, especially in light of the fact that I can
> cite a half dozen times where she says to reject unchosen obligations
> and an entire essay (Duty versus Causality) firmly rejecting any
> notion that "rights imply duties" as you have said.

Once again, I have said in several posts now that "rights imply negative
obligations" not "duties"; and this is exactly what Rand has said.

--
Gordon