Group: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
From: Charles Bell
Date: Wednesday, February 27, 2008 8:08 PM
Subject: Re: Thoroughgoing Collectivism

On Feb 27, 8:19 pm, Gordon Sollars wrote:
> In article > @c33g2000hsd.googlegroups.com>, cbel...@bellsouth.net says...
>
> > On Feb 27, 5:56 pm, Gordon Sollars wrote:
> > A positive right is as a right to be
> > > provided with something - the antithesis of what Rand thought rights
> > > were about.
>
> > No, that is not what a "positive right" means. A progressive liberal
> > might take it to mean that, but literally it means "a right to . . .
> > "  and a "negative right" can either mean "no right to . .. " or
> > "right to do anything but . . ."
>
> Yes, it is what "positive right" means - it is modern liberals that have
> brought the term into use.  Classical liberals were content with
> negative rights.
>
> > Rand does not use the concepts of
> > positive or negative rights, so we can not hold her to this
> > distinction in any case.
>
> She clearly rejects the *concept* of positive rights (VOS, p96).  I am
> not holding her to any distinction that she does not make herself,
> however it might be labeled.
>

She rejects the concept of what is the progressive liberal positive
right. She herself does not use the terms "negative" or "positive"
right in the classical liberal or any other sense except for the very
sentence before your favorite quote:

"Thus, for every individual, a right is the moral SANCTION OF A
POSITIVE -- of his freedom to act on his own judgment, for his own
goals, by his own voluntary, uncoerced choice."

in contrast to the sentence following it:

"As to his neighbors, his rights impose no obligations on them except
of a negative kind: to abstain from violating his rights."

This is what so confused you when I put Rand's concept of rights and
obligations in context and CONTRASTED the right to life (first
sentence) to the political right of obligations of a negative kind
(second sentence) as one of positive rights versus negative rights.
This is to say, again, that the right to life overrides any political
right, which, at its fundamental meaning, is only a right to do
nothing. The contrast is not just of "positive" versus "negative" but
one of "moral" versus "political" rights -- something else about which
you show great confusion.


> > I only brought in  the comparison because
> > what Rand does say with respect to "a moral right to life . . ." is
> > entirely analogous to a "positive" right, but with *no* forced/
> > unchosen/implied obligations from/to anybody, a negative right in a
> > social context
>
> A positive right without a positive obligation to provide some value is
> not a positive right at all.  See the list of eight "rights" that Rand
> attacks on page 96.  These are "rights" to the efforts of others -
> positive rights - which Rand rejects - as opposed to negative rights
> which are the keystone of her political philosophy - as shown by her
> approval of the founding principles of the U.S. (p 93).
>
> > > > > she says that the right of one imposes a
> > > > > negative obligation on others.  
>
> > No, she does not say that.


She says his moral rights, and any derivative political rights, cannot
make anybody do anything he does not want to do.

She says that no political right can impose on any moral right unless
that political right is chosen and only then in the context in which
it is chosen [i.e., politics-government-law may impose a military
draft but that draft is a violation of the moral right to be free of
unchosen obligations.]

>
> Yes, she dos - right on page 94.
>
> > She says there are no obligations which
> > can be imposed on anybody and that is the "negative right", in a
> > political context, of obligation.  You are taking four words, never
> > used again by Rand, out of context to the entirety of her philosophy.
>
> Not at all.  I am recognizing that Rand rejected unchosen positive
> obligations while endorsing that rights imply a negative obligation.


Rand never said to reject unchosen positive obligations. She said to
reject unchosen obligations. She "endorsed" any political right that
implies no unchosen obligations, and the political right, once chosen,
of itself means the right to do nothing to/by/for anyone without his
consent. An obligation of a negative kind is this obligation to do
nothing, absent consent. If you do not like this interpretation of
Rand's words, I ask that you find any textual evidence that Rand must
have meant something else, especially in light of the fact that I can
cite a half dozen times where she says to reject unchosen obligations
and an entire essay (Duty versus Causality) firmly rejecting any
notion that "rights imply duties" as you have said. A man's first
right is his moral right to act on his own judgment, for his own
goals, by his own voluntary, uncoerced choice, and everything else is
secondary to that.

Safety Articles | Usenet Groups | Usenet News | Bluegrass