In article
> On Feb 27, 5:56 pm, Gordon Sollars
> A positive right is as a right to be
> > provided with something - the antithesis of what Rand thought rights
> > were about.
>
> No, that is not what a "positive right" means. A progressive liberal
> might take it to mean that, but literally it means "a right to . . .
> " and a "negative right" can either mean "no right to . .. " or
> "right to do anything but . . ."
Yes, it is what "positive right" means - it is modern liberals that have
brought the term into use. Classical liberals were content with
negative rights.
> Rand does not use the concepts of
> positive or negative rights, so we can not hold her to this
> distinction in any case.
She clearly rejects the *concept* of positive rights (VOS, p96). I am
not holding her to any distinction that she does not make herself,
however it might be labeled.
> I only brought in the comparison because
> what Rand does say with respect to "a moral right to life . . ." is
> entirely analogous to a "positive" right, but with *no* forced/
> unchosen/implied obligations from/to anybody, a negative right in a
> social context
A positive right without a positive obligation to provide some value is
not a positive right at all. See the list of eight "rights" that Rand
attacks on page 96. These are "rights" to the efforts of others -
positive rights - which Rand rejects - as opposed to negative rights
which are the keystone of her political philosophy - as shown by her
approval of the founding principles of the U.S. (p 93).
> > > > she says that the right of one imposes a
> > > > negative obligation on others.
> >
>
> No, she does not say that.
Yes, she dos - right on page 94.
> She says there are no obligations which
> can be imposed on anybody and that is the "negative right", in a
> political context, of obligation. You are taking four words, never
> used again by Rand, out of context to the entirety of her philosophy.
Not at all. I am recognizing that Rand rejected unchosen positive
obligations while endorsing that rights imply a negative obligation.
> Two other times in that same essay, not to mention treating the
> subject on its own in /Duty and Causality/, she says that there are
> no imposed or unchosen obligations of any kind.
By which she means "positive obligations".
> You have chosen not
> to deal with the subject as discussed in /Duty and Causality/ because
> thereby you can even begin to impose your false impression of
> Objectivism into the discussion.
I don't any problem dealing with that essay - she is rejecting what she
defines as "duty", which is not the same as a negative obligation. You
are the one who cannot account for her use of "negative obligations" -
which she says are "imposed" - in "Man's Rights".
--
Gordon