humanities.philosophy.objectivism

In article <75f2a3ef-e615-494b-b8e5-07c9a668bd90
@m23g2000hsc.googlegroups.com>, cbell97@bellsouth.net says...
> On Feb 25, 11:36 pm, Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
> > > Negative obligations means doing nothing.  One cannot be forced to do
> > > nothing in a political-legal sense.
> >
> > What nonsense.  The term "negative obligations" does not refer to "doing
> > nothing" as if no actions are available, but rather to obligations which
> > do not impose actions but restrain them.
>
> She never uses the words "restrain" or restraint at all,

So what? I am explaining the term "negative obligation". A negative
obligation restricts the actions that may be taken.

> and never
> uses the word "impose" except:
>
> "... his rights impose no obligations on them."

You are shaming yourself. A person with a modicum of integrity and
honesty would at least put ellipses after "them". A man of virtue would
give the whole quote.

"...his rights impose no obligations on them except of a negative
kind..."

> "No man can have a right to impose an unchosen obligation."
> " . . .but impose no obligations on other men."
>
> In every case, doing *nothing* or being *nothing* -- no "restraint" by
> anyone or anything implied. No "power" enforced. Only the concept of
> chosen obligations consistenly applied to political rights.
>
> On the other hand, in your theory of rights, one is subject to the
> imposition of force (power) to make something *not* happen -- to
> restrain someone by some magical force of "duty" to do nothing..

No, on my theory one has the negative obligation not to violate the
right of another - just like in Rand's theory. This says nothing at all
about force or power. The power to violate rights is all around us, and
we see rights violated all the time. This has no effect whatsoever on
the fact that those violating the rights have a negative obligation to
refrain from doing so. "A right is not a power." Try writing that a
thousand times.

> >.  Whether a person can
> > be forced comply with a negative obligation not to interfere with the
> > right to life of another is immaterial
>
> . . . Not when you assert, as you and Prescott do, that there is such
> a thing a "moral obligation" or "duty", and that rights imply duty.

Your attempts to confuse me with Prescott simply from the pique you feel
because I pegged the two of you as neo-Hobbesian peas in a pod is
childish. What I have said is that rights imply negative obligations -
just as Rand has said.

--
Gordon