humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Feb 24, 6:24 pm, Gordon Sollars wrote:
> > You
> > have done nothing to explain your own definition of duty either way.
>

> I don't have any special definitions,


Maybe you should try it sometime; it would make your sentences less
convoluted and your statements less contradictory.


>
> > > > No, I do not say "a promise creates a morally binding obligation."  I
> > > > say it is moral, good and proper to enter into obligations  that are
> > > > beneficial to oneself, and once entered, not lightly (but also not
> > > > impossibly) abrogated. There is nothing whatsoever "binding" one to an
> > > > obligation except for reason and causality,...
>
> > > If there is *any* issue of the impermissibility of abrogating, then you
> > > have, to that degree, a morally binding obligation.  
>
> > I never said "impermissiblity".  Do you think, for once, you can use
> > the words I use when trying to refute what I say?  There is no such
> > thing as "impermissiblity" (= duty) in moral choices.
>
> So you are saying it *is* permissible to "lightly abrogate" an
> obligation made by a promise?  


I am not using the word "permissible" at all. I am not giving anyone
permission to make an obligation or denying anyone permission to make
an obligation. Prescott and you have done that with unchosen legal
obligations, where one is somehow not given permission to choose his
obligattions.


> > > No one has asserted
> > > that an obligation cannot be overridden.  
>
> > You have actually said nothing in this regard except there is legal
> > obligation because the law says there is, nor do you explain the
> > phrase "moral obligation" in the context of anybody making a choice.
> > You *have* said the "rights" imply "duty",  but in light of your
> > statement here, you must mean that any right can be "overridden" by
> > moral choice.
>
> To say that an obligation can be overridden is not to say that any right
> can be.  (Perhaps the problem is that English your not first language?  


Maybe the problem is that you have entangled rights with duty and it
is confusing when you are talking about one without the other.


> > What is to "bind" a man to a choice in a reality of individual will
> > and absolute freedom to exercise that will?
>
> For example, the rights of others.

In a moral context, there are no "rights of others". There is only
the right to life that is the same among all, and that right never
makes individual will and the freedom in which to exercise that will
go away.

> ...
>
> > > > If a "promise" is a verbal commitment by one person to another
> > > > agreeing to do (or not to do) something in the future, and an
> > > > obligation is the "something" to do (or not to do) in the future, I
> > > > would say the connection is obvious.
>
> > > Why is obvious about it?  Why is anyone bound to perform the
> > > "something" when the time comes?
>
> > In what I said above, no one is "bound" to do anything.  Again, try to
> > use my actual words before attempting to refute them.
>
> You are using the actual word "obligation".  I have no objection to your
> using your own invented language, but you need to make clear when you
> are doing so.

My use of the words "obligation" and "duty" was already established
in the first message of this thread, and already known to anyone
familiar enough with Objectivism.


> > > > > Of course, it can be argued, by
> > > > > an egoist anyway, that there is much to identify "one human being from
> > > > > another" -
>
> > > > I was not referring to "much";  I was referring to any claim to a
> > > > moral right to life.
>
> > > You said "sufficiently enough".  I said "much" because it is one word,
>
> > . . .   because you prefer to use words that I never used in order to
> > refute something you say that I said.  "Sufficiently enough" does not
> > even come close to meaning "much".
>
> > > but replace it with "sufficiently enough" and try again.  Or evade again
> > > - it's up to you.
>
> > Are you really that ignorant that you cannot see "sufficiently enough"
> > of a human being that is not another kind of animal?
>
> Am I really that ignorant that I will let you get away with saying that
> two human beings are "sufficiently enough" so that they cannot be
> "specially distinguish[]... in that way" without an explanation of what
> "that way" refers to?  


Right. We are to believe that you cannot distinguish a human being
from a dog, or more important, that a physical difference such as race
should be enough to deny equality in the moral right to life.


> > Furthermore, are
> > you willing to state that you know a man is not endowed with an
> > independent will?
>
> No - why should I?

Because you have not defined what you mean by "moral obligation" and/
or "duty" and therefore one can only assume that you have difficulty
with the concept of men with wills independent of each other or of
something as yet undefined by you in which this "duty" operates.



> > That it is possible that there two individuals with
> > *exactly* the same consciousness, patterns of thought and life
> > experiences?
>
> I think this is false - but so what?

Again. without your definition of "duty" it is helpful to know if it
is reasonable to expect from you the concept of individuality.

>
> > That there is a mystical binding force out there which
> > compels individuals to always make the same choice under the same
> > circumstances?
>
> Not if quantum mechanics is correct.



Non sequitur, unless QM is the source of your "duty". Is it?



> > > > I am saying that I must be aware that he *may* not hold to any
> > > > obligation that he should respect my right to life for he *may* be an
> > > > irrational man or he *may* have not had the opportunity to imbue
> > > > himself in a culture of reason and a moral code of rational self-
> > > > interest (see Islam).
>
> > > You are confused between "may" and "might".  Indeed, a person *might*
> > > fail to act on any obligation to respect your right to life.  But to say
> > > that he *may* do so is to say that it is permissible for him to do so,
>
> > Again, you prefer to use words that I did not use in order to refute
> > something you say I said.  In the context of my words "may" is a
> > subjunctive tense referring to condition that is possible but *may*
> > not be actual -- not as in "permissible".   The distinction between
> > "may" and "might" is the first is present subjective tense (my word)
> > and the second is past subjective tense (your word).
>
> OK, then you have a non sequitur rather than a confusion. That it is
> possible that a person not hold to a duty to respect your right to life
> does not show that you do not have such a claim.

A man cannot hold to "duty" which does not exist, and I would not
expect another man to hold to something which does not exist.


> > > Now I get it!  You are a cultural relativist!  
>
> > No, I am asking what do you do in your gangland utopia of moral
> > obligation with those who do not have the same sense of moral
> > obligation that you do?
>
> You mean, how are moral rights enforced?  

No.


> We have been nowhere near that
> question.  But, since it concerns you, *I* don't do anything with them.  
> In my utopia, the law more or less tracks morality, and those who break
> the law more or less are punished.  I say "more or less" because I like
> *my* utopia to have some elements of realism.  How are things in your
> utopia?


I don't believe in government-less utopias or in societies where
people keep track on other people's (sense of) morality.
>
> What seems to bother you immensely is the idea that someone might choose
> to violate another's right.  So greatly does this disturb you that you
> have decided to insulate rights from such depredation by defining them
> so that they make no claims at all.  So you "save" them by gutting them!              

I would like to clarify that "rights" cannot be something which are
mystical in nature beholden to some mysterious and undefinable "duty".


>
> > > Rights are about adjudicating disputes among persons who may indeed have
> > > differing values.  
>
> > No. (Moral, not to say legal) rights are not that.
>
> Yes, they are, or they can provide no guidance on what the law should
> be.


For someone so enamored of the government-less society you have an
obsession with the law. You chronically cannot distinguish what are
legal rights and what is a moral right. Legal rights are used in
negotiating among disputes, not moral rights. In anarchy, two persons
may lay claim to the same resource and each may have an equal claim by
the right to life and the ancillary rights that go with the right to
life, but there is nothing in the nature of these moral rights that
*can* settle that dispute. There must have been a prior negotiation,
a contractual agreement, in the form of agreed-upon rights, and with
government these agreed-upon rights become legal rights. This much
Prescott has right. Prescott, however, denies any existence of moral
rights that precede legal rights, and it is true that there is nothing
in moral rights themselves that can effect dispute-resolution. The
meaning of the rational recognition of *equal* moral rights, by the
Law of Identity, is that the negotiation is necessary but never
obligatory prior to negotiation [ONE CANNOT HAVE AN OBLIGATION PRIOR
TO A CHOICE BEING PRESENTED], and what you appear to say (in tacit
agreement with Prescott) is that there is some "moral obligation"
prior to negotiation to engage in negotiation, and I am saying that no
such obligation exists at all -- only, perhaps, a rational conclusion
that negotiation is necessary for long-term self-interest.