humanities.philosophy.objectivism

In article @n77g2000hse.googlegroups.com>, cbell97@bellsouth.net says...
> On Feb 24, 6:24 pm, Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
> > So you are saying it *is* permissible to "lightly abrogate" an
> > obligation made by a promise?  
>
>
> I am not using the word "permissible" at all.

You can put your head in the sand, but that does not make you butt
disappear.

> I am not giving anyone
> permission to make an obligation or denying anyone permission to make
> an obligation.

The issue is not what *you* do, but whether it is wrong to "lightly
abrogate" a promise. Is it or not? The answer does not depend on what
you do or don't do.
...
> > > What is to "bind" a man to a choice in a reality of individual will
> > > and absolute freedom to exercise that will?
> >
> > For example, the rights of others.
>
> In a moral context, there are no "rights of others". There is only
> the right to life that is the same among all,

This is just silly. If "all" have a right, then "others" have it -
"others" being a part of "all".

> and that right never
> makes individual will and the freedom in which to exercise that will
> go away.

So what? You are stonkered because a person can choose to violate a
right!
...
> > > In what I said above, no one is "bound" to do anything.  Again, try to
> > > use my actual words before attempting to refute them.
> >
> > You are using the actual word "obligation".  I have no objection to your
> > using your own invented language, but you need to make clear when you
> > are doing so.
>
> My use of the words "obligation" and "duty" was already established
> in the first message of this thread, and already known to anyone
> familiar enough with Objectivism.

More evasion. Evade, twist, and turn! As it happens, I joined this
thread after the first message; it is not on my newsreader; and I am not
going to take the time to google it because you are being childish.
...
> > Am I really that ignorant that I will let you get away with saying that
> > two human beings are "sufficiently enough" so that they cannot be
> > "specially distinguish[]... in that way" without an explanation of what
> > "that way" refers to?  
>
>
> Right. We are to believe that you cannot distinguish a human being
> from a dog, or more important, that a physical difference such as race
> should be enough to deny equality in the moral right to life.

Again the evasion! The question was, what is "that way"? What is the
thing that is not specially distinguishable, and why does it make a
moral difference?

> > > Furthermore, are
> > > you willing to state that you know a man is not endowed with an
> > > independent will?
> >
> > No - why should I?
>
> Because you have not defined what you mean by "moral obligation" and/
> or "duty"

As I said before:

I don't have any special definitions, whether for "duty", "obligation"
or "right". Special definitions are your province. My dictionary says
a "right" is "a just claim or title, whether legal or moral". Now, a
"just claim" is one that ought to be respected. Here, again, I defining
in no special way. A claim that one "ought to respect" marks out a
duty.

Do I have to put it in CAPS FOR YOU?

> and therefore one can only assume that you have difficulty
> with the concept of men with wills independent of each other or of
> something as yet undefined by you in which this "duty" operates.

I have no problem with it; but the fact of independent wills does
nothing to undermine the idea that a right implies a duty.

> > > That it is possible that there two individuals with
> > > *exactly* the same consciousness, patterns of thought and life
> > > experiences?
> >
> > I think this is false - but so what?
>
> Again. without your definition of "duty" it is helpful to know if it
> is reasonable to expect from you the concept of individuality.

The concept of "individuality" does not come from me. It was around
before I got here, and it will be around after I leave. You are not
making any sense.

> > > That there is a mystical binding force out there which
> > > compels individuals to always make the same choice under the same
> > > circumstances?
> >
> > Not if quantum mechanics is correct.
>
> Non sequitur, unless QM is the source of your "duty". Is it?

It is not a non sequitur. If QM is correct, then under the "same
circumstances" different things could happen, including individuals
making different choices.
...
> > OK, then you have a non sequitur rather than a confusion. That it is
> > possible that a person not hold to a duty to respect your right to life
> > does not show that you do not have such a claim.
>
> A man cannot hold to "duty" which does not exist,

Of course he can - he could be mistaken, thinking that it did exist.
Your "argument" is that duty cannot exist because persons can act
without regard to duty. But that a person can act wrongly does not
imply that no wrongness exists, anymore than that a person can break the
law implies the law does not exist. Indeed, it is quite the opposite..

> and I would not
> expect another man to hold to something which does not exist.

So, again, when someone comes to take your life, you lack any resource
to explain that he ought not do so.
...
> > We have been nowhere near that
> > question.  But, since it concerns you, *I* don't do anything with them.  
> > In my utopia, the law more or less tracks morality, and those who break
> > the law more or less are punished.  I say "more or less" because I like
> > *my* utopia to have some elements of realism.  How are things in your
> > utopia?
>
>
> I don't believe in government-less utopias or in societies where
> people keep track on other people's (sense of) morality.

Then you are disconnected from reality - people keep track of other
people's sense of morality right here in the actual world.

> > What seems to bother you immensely is the idea that someone might choose
> > to violate another's right.  So greatly does this disturb you that you
> > have decided to insulate rights from such depredation by defining them
> > so that they make no claims at all.  So you "save" them by gutting them!              
>
> I would like to clarify that "rights" cannot be something which are
> mystical in nature beholden to some mysterious and undefinable "duty".

That's been clear from the start.
...
> > > No. (Moral, not to say legal) rights are not that.
> >
> > Yes, they are, or they can provide no guidance on what the law should
> > be.
>
>
> For someone so enamored of the government-less society you have an
> obsession with the law. You chronically cannot distinguish what are
> legal rights and what is a moral right.

On the contrary, I regularly distinguish between them. I last did so in
my sentence above.

> Legal rights are used in
> negotiating among disputes, not moral rights.

Nonsense. People use moral rights in their negotiations all the time.
Have you ever been married?

> In anarchy, two persons
> may lay claim to the same resource and each may have an equal claim by
> the right to life and the ancillary rights that go with the right to
> life, but there is nothing in the nature of these moral rights that
> *can* settle that dispute. There must have been a prior negotiation,
> a contractual agreement, in the form of agreed-upon rights, and with
> government these agreed-upon rights become legal rights.

You have not been able to explain why a prior negotiation creates moral
rights that ought to be respected. Indeed, you cannot, since you reject
the idea that a right is a claim that ought to be respected.
...
> [ONE CANNOT HAVE AN OBLIGATION PRIOR
> TO A CHOICE BEING PRESENTED],

Then one cannot have an obligation after a choice is presented, either.
There has to be a reason why it is proper to keep a promise, else the
obligation is merely a description of what could be done, with no more
significance than any other action that could be taken.


--
Gordon