humanities.philosophy.objectivism

In article <5188330d-8d54-4e39-aefd-f4e6a5399100
@n75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com>, cbell97@bellsouth.net says...
> On Feb 24, 1:41 pm, Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
> > But then, when I ask the question again:
> > ...
>
> It was a different question.

It was the same point, but you can't come to terms with it regardless of
how I state it.
...
> You
> have done nothing to explain your own definition of duty either way.

I don't have any special definitions, whether for "duty", "obligation"
or "right". Special definitions are your province. My dictionary says
a "right" is "a just claim or title, whether legal or moral". Now, a
"just claim" is one that ought to be respected. Here, again, I defining
in no special way. A claim that one "ought to respect" marks out a
duty.
...
> > > No, I do not say "a promise creates a morally binding obligation."  I
> > > say it is moral, good and proper to enter into obligations  that are
> > > beneficial to oneself, and once entered, not lightly (but also not
> > > impossibly) abrogated. There is nothing whatsoever "binding" one to an
> > > obligation except for reason and causality,...
> >
> > If there is *any* issue of the impermissibility of abrogating, then you
> > have, to that degree, a morally binding obligation.  
>
> I never said "impermissiblity". Do you think, for once, you can use
> the words I use when trying to refute what I say? There is no such
> thing as "impermissiblity" (= duty) in moral choices.

So you are saying it *is* permissible to "lightly abrogate" an
obligation made by a promise? Either it is or it isn't - see *Atlas
Shrugged*, Part II, heading.


> > No one has asserted
> > that an obligation cannot be overridden.  
>
> You have actually said nothing in this regard except there is legal
> obligation because the law says there is, nor do you explain the
> phrase "moral obligation" in the context of anybody making a choice.
> You *have* said the "rights" imply "duty", but in light of your
> statement here, you must mean that any right can be "overridden" by
> moral choice.

To say that an obligation can be overridden is not to say that any right
can be. (Perhaps the problem is that English your not first language?
I had not been considering that.) Nevertheless, it might be that any
right can be overridden by *something* - that's a difficult question,
and fortunately one not at issue.
...
> > You keep returning to the view that a binding obligation requires
> > something mystical or some reward or punishment.  Why do you think that?
>
> What is to "bind" a man to a choice in a reality of individual will
> and absolute freedom to exercise that will?

For example, the rights of others.
...
> > > If a "promise" is a verbal commitment by one person to another
> > > agreeing to do (or not to do) something in the future, and an
> > > obligation is the "something" to do (or not to do) in the future, I
> > > would say the connection is obvious.
> >
> > Why is obvious about it?  Why is anyone bound to perform the
> > "something" when the time comes?
>
> In what I said above, no one is "bound" to do anything. Again, try to
> use my actual words before attempting to refute them.

You are using the actual word "obligation". I have no objection to your
using your own invented language, but you need to make clear when you
are doing so. In English, an "obligation" is something one is bound to
do. If the oblgiation is not performed, then one is said to have
"broken" the promise. Perhaps this is all new to you? My point can be
phrased as, "What is morally wrong with breaking a promise?"
...
> > I did not say anything about Kant's theory of rights; I said that you
> > made a "Kantian argument", i.e., an argument in the form that Kant would
> > make.  To say that rationality provides no basis for distinguishing one
> > human being from another has a Kantian form.
>
> I see. Again, you prefer to use words and sentiments I never used in
> order to refute something you are saying I said. In point of fact, I
> have said exactly the opposite: that reason, with the reality of
> Identity and Causality, is the determining basis of rights and chosen
> obligation. Kant said the opposite.

No, actually, Kant looks to reason to determine what duty is. But this
is beside the point. I did not claim that your argument was Kantian in
substance, but rather in its form.

>
> >
> > > > Of course, it can be argued, by
> > > > an egoist anyway, that there is much to identify "one human being from
> > > > another" -
> >
> > > I was not referring to "much";  I was referring to any claim to a
> > > moral right to life.
> >
> > You said "sufficiently enough".  I said "much" because it is one word,
>
> . . . because you prefer to use words that I never used in order to
> refute something you say that I said. "Sufficiently enough" does not
> even come close to meaning "much".
>
>
> > but replace it with "sufficiently enough" and try again.  Or evade again
> > - it's up to you.
>
>
> Are you really that ignorant that you cannot see "sufficiently enough"
> of a human being that is not another kind of animal?

Am I really that ignorant that I will let you get away with saying that
two human beings are "sufficiently enough" so that they cannot be
"specially distinguish[]... in that way" without an explanation of what
"that way" refers to? No.

> Furthermore, are
> you willing to state that you know a man is not endowed with an
> independent will?

No - why should I?

> That it is possible that there two individuals with
> *exactly* the same consciouness, patterns of thought and life
> experiences?

I think this is false - but so what?

> That there is a mystical binding force out there which
> compels individuals to always make the same choice under the same
> circumstances?

Not if quantum mechanics is correct. I am wondering, do you have a
fever?
...
> > > I am saying that I must be aware that he *may* not hold to any
> > > obligation that he should respect my right to life for he *may* be an
> > > irrational man or he *may* have not had the opportunity to imbue
> > > himself in a culture of reason and a moral code of rational self-
> > > interest (see Islam).
> >
> > You are confused between "may" and "might".  Indeed, a person *might*
> > fail to act on any obligation to respect your right to life.  But to say
> > that he *may* do so is to say that it is permissible for him to do so,
>
>
> Again, you prefer to use words that I did not use in order to refute
> something you say I said. In the context of my words "may" is a
> subjunctive tense referring to condition that is possible but *may*
> not be actual -- not as in "permissible". The distinction between
> "may" and "might" is the first is present subjective tense (my word)
> and the second is past subjective tense (your word).

OK, then you have a non sequitur rather than a confusion. That it is
possible that a person not hold to a duty to respect your right to life
does not show that you do not have such a claim.

> > Now I get it!  You are a cultural relativist!  
>
>
> No, I am asking what do you do in your gangland utopia of moral
> obligation with those who do not have the same sense of moral
> obligation that you do?

You mean, how are moral rights enforced? We have been nowhere near that
question. But, since it concerns you, *I* don't do anything with them.
In my utopia, the law more or less tracks morality, and those who break
the law more or less are punished. I say "more or less" because I like
*my* utopia to have some elements of realism. How are things in your
utopia?

What seems to bother you immensely is the idea that someone might choose
to violate another's right. So greatly does this disturb you that you
have decided to insulate rights from such depredation by defining them
so that they make no claims at all. So you "save" them by gutting them!

> > Rights are about adjudicating disputes among persons who may indeed have
> > differing values.  
>
> No. (Moral, not to say legal) rights are not that.

Yes, they are, or they can provide no guidance on what the law should
be.

> Individual (moral,
> natural) rights are a way to subordinate society to moral law. How do
> comprise a "society" in which there are those like you and Prescott
> and your typical theocrat who wishes to subordinate the individual to
> moral law?

Are you saying that no societies exist?

--
Gordon