humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Mar 6, 8:32 pm, Jim Klein wrote:
> On Mar 6, 12:35 pm, TC wrote:

> > The data is what it is - a tautology.
> > But can you be be certain about the source of the data?

> Yes. Silly little imaginations like brains in a vat might be
> testament to our ability to highly conceptualize, but
> they're hardly the least bit of an argument to dispute
> that reality is as it is, and that it's reality which is the
> source of the data.

Like I said they are improbable -- but not impossible.

> > Can you even be certain about the nature of the data on
> > the basis of your perceptions?

> Yes, even as I can't be certain of the entire nature of
> anything, owing to context.

So you are not certain. Is it that you just like
to assert certainty?

> I may at least be certain
> that reality is imparting the data and I am sensing it.

I believe that too. I'm just not totally certain about
the nature of reality.

> That's as self-evident as the fact that I'm thinking.

So tell me what is it that reality certainly is?

> Thus
> I may be certain that my senses are actually sensing
> reality-imparted sense data.

You go too far. You cannot be absolutely certain
of this - rather I am not absolutely certain of same
and I think the same applies to everyone.

> "What the hell ELSE would they be sensing?"

The product of some uber industrial light and magic.

> That doesn't get us to omniscience, but it gets us to a
> certainty that our perceptions are reality-based.

I'm there with a high degree of likelihood.
........
> > > how it is because the object imparting it, is how it is.
> > Assuming the object exists and is not the product of
> > some uber-hollywod CGI studio.

> The thing is, things like assumptions are way, way farther
> along the conceptual path, than pure physical sensations.

The sensations, the experience exists. But it is
not certain what they are the result of.

> So if you think about it, it's an invalid approach to use
> such methods for trying to deny that upon which they're
> built. Concepts like or , if
> anything, IMPLY that our percepts are integrations of
> the state of reality.

Sorry. That just does not work. It is highly improbable
that reality is not closely related to what we experience
but not certain.

I also reject the Objectivist integration epistemology,
it ignores too much biology.

> You couldn't have the concept unless you had
> the concept ,

So?

> and you couldn't have the concept
> without a state of reality to which to appeal.

That I disagee with. I can imagine a concept
of truth for the mathematician's brain in the bottle.

> It's a
> conceptual /hierarchy/, with the base as the perception of
> reality, combined with some sort of axiom like, "Reality is
> as it is," or something like that. All BIV theories and the like
> do, is come up with a way to try to defeat the axiom.

They actually succeed in defeating it.
The hierarchy is brittle by the way.

> Well, okay. I suppose if A isn't A, then maybe nothing is
> certain.

A is A is quite true for BIV.

> But if it is, then plenty is certain. I think it's
> pretty reasonable to be certain that A is A...that reality is
> as it is

I'm with you so far.

AND that our perceptions are as they are.

I agree with this. But I probably mean something
different by it than you do. Our perceptions are
what they are but that does not imply that the
object perceived as red is red. Just that the
perception is of red.

> Put the
> two together and voila...we're perceiving reality.

Wrong.

> "What the hell ELSE would we be perceiving?"

The result of some aspect of what exists,
perhaps product of ILM, perhaps just a complicated
indirectly computed product of physics.

Tom