humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Fri, 29 Feb 2008 08:30:47 -0800, Agent Cooper
wrote:

>On Feb 29, 7:10 am, TC wrote:
>>
>> Certainties are possible in mathematics.
>
>I think it depends upon what the meaning of the word "in" is. If there
>are things I can be certain of in the real world then there are things
>I can be certain of in mathematics. But if you mean being impervious
>to error, well, that's not true either. I make mathematical errors all
>the time, think I don't, etc. Yes We Can, to screwing up our
>checkbooks.
>
>There is no such thing as apriori knowledge. See Philip Kitcher, The
>Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, for details.

Yes, that book is very reminiscent of Peikoff's Analytic-Synthetic
Dichotomy in one way. Kitcher writes, "[T]here arises the conviction
that mathematical knowledge must be obtained from a source different
from perceptual experience." Then in the next paragraph, he named the
"prominent defenders of mathematical apriorism since the seventeenth
century," and of course he named Kant among them.

However, if you actually look at Kant's own example of mathematical
apriorism, he did not omit perceptual experience at all. "For starting
with the number 7, and for the concept of 5 calling in the aid of the
fingers of my hand as intuition, I now add one by one to the number 7
the units which I previously took together to form the number
5, and with the aid of that figure [the hand] see the number 12
come into being...Arithmetical propositions are therefore always
synthetic." (B15-16.) So in order to derive this knowledge, Kant
called upon the guidance of perceptual experience.

Kitcher's error is a common one: in focusing on the apriori aspect, he
forgot Kant's synthetic-analytic distinction.

Now it may be the case that the other illustrious names Kitcher named
along with Kant's confused "apriori" with "analytic," just as Kitcher
has. Because it is only analytic propositions which do not require
consulting the empirical, or perceptual experience. Thus Kitcher is
assuming that apriori = analytic, a common mistake. But, it is not a
mistake made by Kant, therefore Kitcher's simplistic idea of "apriori"
as calling on "a source different from perceptual experience" does not
hold water.

But wait: doesn't "apriori" mean something like
(http://www.theology.edu/theology/glossary.htm)
"A statement whose truth or falsity may be known prior to any appeal
to experience"?
Or by this definition:
http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/a5.htm#a-pr
"the a priori is taken to be independent of sensory experience."

Doesn't the very meaning of "apriori" exclude experience? How can Kant
justify the existence of a contradictory notion such as the synthetic
apriori, one which is both dependent and independent of experience?

If however we consult Kant, who had much to say on the subject,
we find statements such as this one in which Kant writes that a priori
knowledge determines "something in regard to [objects] prior to their
being given," that is, principles, fundamental postulates of thought,
or simply, pure theory. (Bxvi) So prior to any experience of objects,
even the Objectivist must admit that 'A is A' is an apriori principle,
not only of reason, but formally anticipating experience insofar as it
contains knowledge from necessity, thus certainty. "A is A," as a
necessary formal construct, was not learned from experience a
posteriori, because it lacks a single element which experience cannot
lend it, and that is philosophical *necessity.* It is indeed so
integral a part of experience itself that without its metaphysical
necessity, which is more than its formulation as a proposition, all
epistemological certainty about experience and judgment, whether
scientific or mathematical, would vanish. Because such certainty is
indeed apriori, that is, priori to experience. It is formulatable as a
necessary proposition because reason requires it, or even demands it,
apriori.

Kitcher's book is thus a classic example of a stolen concept: an
attempt to have his apriori and eat it too. Because lacking apriori
certainty, even in analyzing his formal logic, his thesis becomes
hypothetical, contingent, unestablished and unfounded.

One element that is sorely lacking in this entire debate is an
agreement on definitions. Kitcher would deny completely the idea
that his thesis is unfounded, but only because he conflates the
apriori with the analytical, and that is based on a poorly defined,
non-Kantian concept of "apriori." So once again, as with Peikoff's
essay, Kant is sharing the blame for a situation that would not exist
if only these other illustrious figures named by Kitcher would have
stayed within the domain of Kantian definition.
--
We usually go over the top w/ our new found freedoms.
Unfortunately, her 'followers' are as radical as Pat
Robertson's. Discernment goes out the window.
- A youtube poster