humanities.philosophy.objectivism

Michael J. Glennon Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy Date: March
22, 2002


Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United State, the
U.N. General Assembly "strongly condemn[ed] the heinous acts of
terrorism" but declined to characterize the acts as an "armed attack"
under Article 51. (13) The Security Council also condemned the attacks
in two resolutions that contained preambular language recognizing the
inherent right of self-defense. (14) But the Council stopped short of
authorizing the use of force, which the United States did not seek and
probably did not want. (15)

The implications for the war against terrorism are clear. Use of force
against the Taliban government of Afghanistan was, under the Court's
construction of Article 51 in its Nicaragua opinion, unlawful. For
that matter, if the government of Afghanistan had directly provided
the terrorists with airplane tickets, funds for flight lessons, and
the box cutters used to hijack the aircraft that crashed into the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, or if the Afghan government had
provided the anthrax spores used to contaminate the American postal
system, such support still would not constitute an armed attack, and
use of force against the Afghan government would therefore not have
been permitted. Indeed, the entire approach of the United States in
fighting terrorism--refusing to distinguish between terrorists and
those who harbor them, which has come to be called the "Bush
Doctrine" (16)--is outlawed by this precept to the extent that it
precludes any use of force against states that only passively provide
a safe harbor for terrorists and avoid substantial involvement in the
terrorists' activities.