humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Mar 11, 1:49 pm, David Schwartz wrote:
> Fred Weiss wrote:

> Do you deny that any of how we view the universe comes from us?

No, but I hope you won't deny that's a straw man.

> > > For example, imagine if you and I were talking 5,000 years ago, and
> > > you asked me if two things could be the same color without human
> > > beings. We have a much better understanding today of how much of color
> > > is intrinsic (the frequencies of light) and how much comes from us (we
> > > sometimes see very different mixes of frequencies as the same color).

> > How do you know that the frequencies of light are intrinsic? That
> > presupposes a myriad of relationships independent of our
> > consciousness.
>
> I don't. I presently think they are, but may in the future determine
> that they're not. That's the progress of science, and this has always
> been a way in which science has advanced. I don't know how we'll know
> when we've gotten to rock bottom.
>
> A good example would be the discovery that human vision includes some
> frequencies and not others -- others that aren't really all that
> different as far as the rest of the world is considered. So much of
> "how things look to us" we now know comes from us (and also from the
> things of course). This doesn't make those appearances any less real
> or any less objective, it just means that they are not just about
> things "out there".

But you are saying we can't ever know which is from "in here" vs. what
is "out there". However you are not seeing the concept stealing you
are doing to say that. The example you gave in regard to color/light
frequency was intended to show that we can't distinguish the two and
yet the very example illustrates that very ability to distinguish the
two - otherwise you have no illustration. You can't have it both ways.
Either it demonstrates our ability to distinguish the two - in which
case we can distinguish (which you are denying) - or it doesn't, in
which case you haven't got an illustration.

> I am not saying we can't be sure about any of our other perceptions.
> Nor am I arguing that because we made a mistake before, we could make
> mistakes again. I am saying that there are specific things we actually
> do not know.

Yeah, but that, too, is a straw man.

Btw, the issue isn't whether because we have made mistakes before that
therefore we *could* make mistakes again. That in fact is true. The
issue is whether because we have made mistakes before that we *are*
making a mistake now. Or, in other words, the sheer fact that we have
the *capacity* to make mistakes doesn't mean that in any given
instance we *are now* making a mistake.

> You are coloring my view through your lens. You could only argue that
> this is total skepticism if you think that consciousness is somehow
> less real than the things it perceives.

But that's not the issue. The skeptic doesn't deny that his
consciousness is real. And as Mal continually reminds us - correctly -
Kant didn't deny that appearances are real. The issue is whether what
we are conscious *of* is real and whether that something is something
distinct and different from consciousness itself. If you can't make
that distinction and assume that difference then you can't avoid the
accusation of Idealism - and you can't, as you apparently can't,
answer the "brain-in-a-vat" challenge.

(Granted the "brain-in-a-vat" isn't technically Idealism. But Idealism
is so incoherent and blatantly absurd that it almost literally can't
be maintained from one breath to the next - except perhaps to total
morons like TeaCup...or Bishop Berkeley.)

>
> > > The principle is that the way we organize our understanding of the
> > > world is a factor both of how the rest of the world is and how we
> > > work. We are as much a part of the world as anything else and our
> > > understanding comes about by our interaction with the rest of the
> > > world.
> > Which, according to you, we have no way of distinguishing. Which is
> > "us" and which is "the world"?
>
> I am not saying we have no way of distinguishing. I presented examples
> where we were able to distinguish and examples where we weren't. We
> most certainly do have ways of distinguishing. For example, we now
> know to what extent apparent color comes from us and what it comes
> from the world.

True. But there in a nutshell is your stolen concept.

> We could be wrong about this, of course,....

This, too, btw is a stolen concept which I assume you can
see...if...ummm....some others around here can't.

How do you know you could be wrong (without assuming the very thing
you are denying)?

> > Isn't that the point of science which in effect you are rejecting
> > here?
>
> It's one of the points of science. The point is, it's very hard to
> know when you've reached the bottom. Are atoms the bottom? Are
> particles? Quarks? Is something even lower what's really "out there"?
> You are asking how we can know when we've reached the bottom, and I
> don't know. We may reach the bottom and not know it.

That, too, is a straw man. And, anyway, it doesn't suggest that atoms,
etc aren't real and independent of us. Just that there are smaller
particles yet which we haven't yet discovered.

And, true, to go back to the earlier point, maybe there is something
yet to be discovered "behind" light frequency. But that doesn't make
light frequency merely "a way that we look at the world".

> What is the world "really" made of? We don't know. All we have are
> models which we validate based on predictive validity. This means the
> world is "really like" the models in many ways.

I hadn't realized the extent to which you are Kantian Pill Popperian.
I'm surprised.

> Absent a consciousness, comparing the sizes of the sun and earth may
> also lose its meaning.

Apples and oranges of course.

I know. Now you'll say that apples and oranges are merely....:-)

Fred Weiss