humanities.philosophy.objectivism

Malrassic Park wrote:

[...]

>Rand's theory assumes that we begin without the ability to make such
>perceptual distinctions. We learn to distinguish separate objects in
>our perceptual field, then integrate them into classes of entities,
>and finally, to form verbal and non-verbal concepts of entities. A
>concept of an entity assumes that it exists within a taxonomical
>system of relationships and inter-relationships. These are not merely
>random classes and sub-classes, the relationships are hierarchical and
>systematically structured.

Except for your first sentence, this is a pretty good summary of ITOE.

[...]

>I'm not arguing against Rand, I am arguing against your proclamation
>that the color red exists outside the mind: "that quality would exist
>in the object regardless of whether we humans would be around to
>perceive it as red."

You are misunderstanding my argument. I am saying that red objects
have a quality that, when we perceive it, appears to us in the form of
the color red. I am not saying that "redness" is in the object apart
from the human consciousness that perceives it.

[...]

>>>With 'regarding' as "a selective focus" (as she said), yours is not a
>>>selective focusing at all. Rand did not say anything about "regarding"
>>>the fact that there "may be" more than one existent. Rand started with
>>>a group of two or more similar members.

>>No, not a group of two or more similar members,

>"A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two
>or more similar members." (6)

Note the word "regarded." This is what you keep missing.

[...]

>That is a capacity based in no explanation at all. At this juncture,
>Rand would want to examine some brains to see how they work. But
>how the brain works is not the question, mental functioning is of
>epistemological relevance here. How does the mind function to regard
>entities as units? How does the mind perceive similarities? How does
>the mind focus its attention? 'It is the task of epistemology to
>provide the answer to the "How?"' (79) Okay, Miss Rand, so tell us
>how the mind perceives similarities, and how the mind focuses its
>attention. No answer? Was that a blank-out, Miss Rand?

She was referring to the parts of the answer to the "how" question
over which we have volitional, conscious control. Conceputalization
is a volitional and fallible process. So, how can we as volitional
beings learn how to do it correctly? Epistemology is about method.
How the brain, senses, and nervous system play their respective roles
in the process goes to science (specifically human biology), not
philosophy.

[...]

>That is teleological 'nonsense', not exactly metaphysics. When
>Aristotle claims that universals subsist in things, that is a
>metaphysical statement. Any statement about universals is metaphysics,
>or better, metaphysics is the study of universals. When Rand or any of
>you refer to the metaphysical, you are locating (reifying) universals
>in the external world. You are being intrinsicists of the moderate
>realist variety.

I flatly deny this. Instead, we are identifying what is the same
about the units subsumed by a concept, i.e. their distinguishing
characteristics, with their measurements omitted so that we can then
regard them AS units and form the concept. For example, every animal
that exists or has ever existed is (or was) a living entity with the
capacities for consciousness and locomotion. This a fact about the
animals, not about us. But the process of abstracting these
characteristics and omitting the measurements is something we do. And
this is an active, volitional process of differentiation and
integration. We don't grasp conceptually what something is merely by
perceiving the object.

>>>At the very least, it takes for granted a
>>>relationship without defining exactly what it is, and at worst it is a
>>>reification.The world outside your mind is not metaphysical, it is
>>>physical. If there is any metaphysical, it is a part of your own mind.
>>>The issue of universals is how to bridge the gap between the
>>>metaphysical (mind) and the physical (matter).

>>The issue is as Rand stated it in the forward. We gain and hold
>>knowledge mostly in conceptual form.

>Rand quoting Edward C. Moore in the Foreword, "All knowledge is in
>terms of concepts." That does not say "mostly."

Rand defines knowledge as "a mental grasp of a fact of reality,
reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason
[conceptualization] based on perceptual observation."

>>But how is it that concepts can
>>represent valid human knowledge of the world outside our mind? The
>>purpose of epistemology is to answer this question. You have to know
>>how to show (prove, validate) that your conceptual conclusions
>>correspond to the way things actually are. Otherwise, all you have
>>is mere guesswork.

>You are confusing epistemology with logic. Correspondence theory is a
>logic theory.

But logic is an integral part of any rational epistemology. Without
it, you cannot establish that your concepts and conclusions constitute
a mental grasp [i.e. identification] of a fact of reality.

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