humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Sun, 23 Mar 2008 10:39:50 -0700, Ken Gardner
wrote:

I see you finally took a day off. That whole "virtue of productivity"
thing needs to go right out the window with all the rest of those
so-called "virtues" which are merely devices to replace religion's
monopoly on morality.

>Malrassic Park wrote:
>
>[...]
>
>>Classifying, or class-formation, is part of Rand's theory and it
>>precedes concept-formation.
>
>She says in the very first sentence of ITOE that conciousness is a
>process of differentiating and integrating, i.e. classifying
>existents. On page 54 or thereabouts, she describes concepts as a
>cognitive method of classification. And in Chapter 7, she describes
>concepts and language as a method for classifying existents. So yes,
>classifying existents by regarding them as units is part of Rand's
>theory.

"Conciousness is a process of differentiating and integrating, i.e.
classifying existents." Classification is not synonymous with
differentation and integration. Your confusion is no doubt due to
Rand's failure to properly identify, that is, define what the process
of classification consists of. She described classification somewhat,
but never defined it.

Rand left her readers with a mish-mash of approximate meanings
for "classification," "property," and "attribute." It is obvious from
the responses I'm getting here that "property" is being treated
synonymously with "attribute." An introductory work should have
at least separated and defined these basic terms.

As a result, people like you are left floundering in a sea of terms
which you believe have been properly formed simply because they
emanated from the mind of Rand.

>>What was the result of Rand merely taking classification for granted
>>and not looking further into the means by which the mind classifies
>>things? She left the door open for someone like me to critique her
>>very method by which she thought to form concepts.
>
>But she merely didn't take classification for granted. She spent the
>first four chapters descriging how the mind classifies existents as
>part of concept-formation.

..."Describing," without ever defining what 'classification' is...

>>First of all, notice that Rand agrees with me on what she calls the
>>criterion of classification: "one may classify things according to
>>their shape or color or weight or size or atomic structure."
>
>In other words, according to characteristics that exist in reality.
>This is why concept-formation (properly performed) is objective, not
>subjective. The mind plays a role in producing concepts, but their
>content is dictated by reality.

An object has the characteristic of reflecting light-waves into your
eyes which you then perceive, through your faculty of perception,
as color. So you see, your mind also plays a role in producing
perceptions. See ITOE pages 5 and 279. Page 5 explains how
percepts are formed by the brain, page 279 explains that 'we perceive
light vibrations as color,' and more, ' Everything we perceive is the
result of our processing.' Processing, of what? Light vibrations, not
color. Color is only the result of the processing.

>>Here's the point that Rand amazingly overlooked: we do not simply
>>classify things by means of their shape or color.

>Rand doesn't deny this. She covers this point in Chapter 3.

I need more to go on than that. That's why I cite page numbers, not
whole chapters.

>>We must first abstract these attributes, these critieria, into properties,
>>in order
>>to grant them meaning for the class of existents. A property, as a
>>class concept, is an attribute that holds true for every entity in the
>>class. An example of such a property, like the criterion of color she
>>mentioned in the quote, would be "redness."
>
>Right.

Right, except Rand never said anything about a property being a class
concept.

>And we do this by means of measurement-omission.

Which, however, doesn't work for defining either "red" or "redness."
Observing the lengths of objects is certainly a matter of perception,
whereas wavelength on the color spectrum is obviously a scientific,
conceptual discovery, not perceived. There is a huge conceptual
difference between lengths of objects and wavelengths which
Rand failed to observe. There are no measurements involved in
distinguishing colors perceptibly. The most you can say is that
there is a certain intensity of light involved, but that is not part
of the perceptual process of distinguishing colors. Rand tried to
reduce all concepts to the perceptual, measurable level, and failed.

>We observe
>that two or more units possess the same distinguishing
>characteristics, but in different measure or degree. So, we omit the
>measurements and integrate the units possessing these characteristics
>into a concept.
.
>Note again that in this process our minds play a part, but reality
>also plays a part. We can do this only becuase the units being
>conceptualized ARE the same in a certain respect (their distinguishing
>characteristics). But the process itself is something we do
>ourselves. It is a volitional, methodical way of organizing
>perceptual material into concepts, propositions, etc.

Regurgitating the theory back to me does nothing to fix Rand's errors.

>>Conceptualization is a method of classification. A concept is a class
>>of units (or alternately, members of a class of existents) defined
>>according to those properties regarded essential to forming the
>>concept.
.
>To be precise, a concept is a mental integration of units, but yes.
>Concepts (and language) are human methods for classifying the material
>that they see, hear, taste, touch, or smell.
.
>>>Not so. There simply needs to be a single existent (although more
>>>than one will do nicely as well).
.
>>Then rather than saying "regarded," Rand should have said "pretended."
.
>The correct concept here is "regarded." "Pretended" implies that you
>know that there is only one such existent, but disregard this fact.
>"Regarded" means that there may be more than one (which actually is
>the case with the vast majority of existents).

I can pretend there are men on the moon without knowing there are such
existents. There wouldn't be much use in pretending something I
already know about.

With 'regarding' as "a selective focus" (as she said), yours is not a
selective focusing at all. Rand did not say anything about "regarding"
the fact that there "may be" more than one existent. Rand started with
a group of two or more similar members. This was followed by two
examples: two stones, not one stone "regarded" as if there may be two
or more; and two square feet of ground, not one square foot of ground
"regarded" as if there could be more than one. That is not selective
focusing, that is pretending there are more than one.

>>What's interesting is that every unit you formed in your explanation
>>is already a concept and so you can take it for granted. The example
>>of the pink elephant, however, is more revealing, in that even if one
>>wanted to form a concept of the only pink elephant in the world, it
>>would not be necessary to "regard" it as a group of two or more pink
>>elephants, but only as a subset of the class "animal," a subset (or
>>class) containing only one member identifiable according to those
>>properties which render it unique.
>
>It would be necessary to regard it as a member of a group of two more
>units if (1) you want to distinguish this pink elephant from other
>animals and (2) you want to refer to (or classify) any other similar
>creatures you might or might not come across in the future as a pink
>elephant. Nature doesn't automatically tell you when there is only
>one of a particular type of thing in the entire universe.

Units are similar. You do not need to regard the existent as a
separate member of a group of two or more similar members (1) if you
need to distinguish this pink elephant from other animals. It stands
apart from the rest without requiring two or more members to regard.
You first need to classify it as a member of the class "elephant." In
this way, you already have two or more similar members, disregarding
for the moment the pink versus grey color differentiation.

So let me try again with my original point. "A unit is an existent
regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar
members." (6) Rand starts with a group of two or more similar members
-- but this is just the idea of a concept analyzed down to what makes
a class of entities capable of being regarded as a unit: their
similarities. This is just circular argumentation which avoids looking
into the mind's very ability to form relationships of similarity.

And what is a member of a group of two or more similar members? A
unit, because you cannot regard it as being a member without implying
that it is also a unit. "Member" is just a way of designating a
particular unit in the context of this discussion. Rand had to regard
it as a unit a priori. A member of a class of existents has to be
regarded as a unit before it can be regarded as a member of a
group of two or more similar existents. Thus, Rand's argument chases
its own tail.

>>I can't identify with the rest of the Rand statement quoted there
>>because she sloppily contradicts herself: units do not exist, what
>>exists are things, but units are things...
>
>Whoa, nellie! She didn't say "units do not exist." She said that
>units do not exist QUA UNITS. The difference is huge. If humans
>ceased to exist, the remaining existents would still exist. The human
>perspective that regards them as units (as opposed to merely
>individual concretes) would be gone.

Is "unit" a concept of consciousness or a concept of method? Is
"similarity" a concept of consciousness or a concept of method? And
where did these concepts come from?

>>And besides, to employ my own saying against me, you're preaching to
>>the converted regarding the role of both mind and matter in producing
>>these thoughts, because I have said this already many times.
>
>In other words, your complaint was that she wasn't sufficiently
>Objectivist enough, but a Aristotelian lamb in Objectivist sheep's
>clothing. But your complaint is still wrong. Again, I refer you to
>pages 52-54, where she differentiates her approach from Plato,
>Aristotle (as she understood him), and the modern nominalists. The
>summation on page 54 is how she actually chose the name "Objectivism."
>That summation is important. Conceptual knowledge is not merely
>revealed to you. You must choose to work for it and then do the work
>yourself. Nor do you make the whole thing up as you go along. To the
>contrary, you form and use concepts in accordance with the facts of
>reality. Your mind plays an essential role and reality plays an
>esential rule. Both are indispensible to the process.

I have said that whenever an Objectivist equates the term
"metaphysical" to the world outside his mind, that is by means of
an Aristotelian implication. At the very least, it takes for granted a
relationship without defining exactly what it is, and at worst it is a
reification.The world outside your mind is not metaphysical, it is
physical. If there is any metaphysical, it is a part of your own mind.
The issue of universals is how to bridge the gap between the
metaphysical (mind) and the physical (matter). Objectivists have
not solved this problem, there is nothing metaphysical about
concept-formation or its product. They only take it for granted as
not requiring resolution, which I take to be the conclusion of ITOE.

>>And I
>>have never said that concepts of qualities such as "rationality" are
>>given purely by the mind. I am saying that qualities are not to be
>>confused with attributes which are existents.
.
>But qualities ARE existents. To be more precise, qualities are types
>(or subdivisions) of attributes.
.
>>Another problem is the fact that Rand never bothered to explain how
>>the concepts "manness" or "redness" are formed.
.
>Did you read the first two chapters of ITOE?

Did you?

>If you missed it, you
>better read it again. The explanation there is crystal clear.

These kinds of questions about what I've read are just plain silly,
not worthy of a substantive response. But I'll make an exception and
say this much. I have to read the material to apply logic to it in
order to find out that it is fallacious begging of questions and
sloppy reasoning.

I will hazard a guess and say that I've read it many more times than
you have. Muttering a few things about "measurement-omission" just
doesn't cut it with me when I know what it means and I also know that
it cannot be a primary. What measurements did you omit when forming
the concept "fame"?

The answer Rand was seeking is in the very problem of universals which
she cast aside. ITOE is analogous with finding a winning lottery
ticket and throwing it away in favor of a loser: measurement-omission.

>>As for the rest of that paragraph, I don't think you'll ever except
>>the idea that the color 'red' doesn't exist externally to the mind, it
>>is a product of perception acting upon light-waves.
>
>You are correct: I would not accept this idea because it is simply
>wrong. The object has a certain attribute or quality that we humans
>call "redness." We call it that because when we perceive it, we
>perceive it as being red, i.e. as being within the red range of color.
>But that quality would exist in the object regardless of whether we
>humans would be around to perceive it as red (or if everyone somehow
>became color-blind).

AR: "We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say
the color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of
the spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of
reality by means of the structure of the eye." (279)

*The color red is not in the object.* Rand got something right for a
change, but only because she chose to believe "evil modern science"
instead of going with her own theory. So you are forced to disagree
with Rand. The 'fact of reality' is the absorption and reflection of
certain parts of the spectrum of light, it is not color.

But she was wrong to say we perceive the absorption and reflection
of light, the latter is a scientific, conceptual discovery not a
perceived fact.

>>Otherwise, we
>>would not need rods and cones in the eye. They only sense that which
>>the brain interprets as color. But this is not known directly, it is a
>>scientific, conceptual discovery.
>
>Sure. That's a different point, and one that I think Rand herself
>made somewhere in ITOE.

It's not a different point. It is stated in general form on page 5 as
the theory of percept-formation, and then this SAME theory is applied
directly to the problem of the primary-secondary distinction on page
279.

The hilarious part is where Peikoff blurted, "Berkeley did the same
thing!" But nobody there seemed to hear it, or maybe the part where he
was slapped down was edited out. Because it is true: Berkeley did the
same thing, Berkeley came up with subjectivism, and - Berkeley was
without doubt a wiser philosopher than Rand who tried to have her
objectivism and eat it too with her theory of percept.

>>Rand stated in ITOE that a concept is a universal or an abstraction.
>>However, she did not state what knowledge is, or she would tend to
>>conflate that term with "concept."
>
>Yes she did. She defined knowledge as "a mental grasp of a fact of
>reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of
>reason based on perceptual observation." See page 35.

Really? And where is the differentia of "knowledge" in that alleged
definition?

To mentally grasp is to understand.

>But I would agree that ITOE does not fully explore what this
>definition actually means. The book is her theory of how we can
>validly hold knowledge in conceptual fom. Such a theory is an
>essential element of any valid theory of knowledge, but not yet
>sufficient. This is because on the conceputal level, human knowledge
>is actually in the form of true propositions (both explicit and
>implicit). Thus, you need to know how to show that a proposition
>corresponds to the actual facts of reality. You need logic as well
>(not to mention grammar, which is about how properly to organize words
>into sentences). And even more fundamentally, you need to have the
>right theory of truth. Unmitigated disasters result when you accept
>the wrong theory (i.e. the coherence theory, as opposed to the
>correspondence theory).

While I'm certain there is implicit knowledge, "implicit" concept is
an obvious conflation with that because, in Rand's own words,
' "Implicit" is a knowledge which is available to you but which you
have not yet grasped consciously.' (159) She also said that in the
case of an implicit concept 'the material from which the concept
"existence" will come is present.' But what is that material? Implicit
knowledge. That is a conflation of terms. And no, I'm not a linguistic
analyst.

>>Pages 5 and 6 only take knowledge for granted, and then delve into the
>>basis for concept-formation. Where does the implicit concept come
>>from? Reality? Rand does not tell us. What does it mean for the
>>concept of an existent to be "implicit in every percept"? Blank-out
>
>She does explain all this. Perhaps not to your satisfaction, but I'm
>fine with it based on my own introspection of how I do it as well as
>observing the same process in infants.
>
>Remember that the concept is not the word symbolizing the concept. We
>form concepts long before we learn to speak. The ability to form
>concepts is a natural human capacity. Even Kantians can do it. :) We
>begin doing it within the first few months of being on the planet.
>Later on, we learn how to organize these implicit concepts into words
>that symbolize or denote these concepts, i.e. we eventually learn how
>to speak and think in a particular language. The tricky part is how
>to do it correctly and, later, how to organize them into true
>propositions about reality. But if you don't even have the implicit
>concepts to begin with, you will never learn language.

That's exactly what I was referring to above. You don't have concepts
by some natural, automatic process. It is pre-conceptual knowledge,
not an 'implicit concept'. So it doesn't matter how much introspection
you've done, not when it was based on a theory that is just wrong.

>>The latter question is important, because it means that *one can have
>>conceptual knowledge before any method of forming concepts has been
>>employed.*
.
>Of course you can. You just don't know yet how to express it. That's
>where language comes in. Again, learning a language is simply
>learning a visual-auditory code that denotes the concepts that you
>have already formed implicitly.
.
>>Here is the difference between "property" and "attribute." An
>>attribute is any quality of an object which you can pick out of
>>perception. A property, on the other hand, is any quality of an object
>>which you can pick out of perception *and then use for the purpose of
>>forming a class.*
.
>As far as I can tell, this is a distinction without a difference.

The distinction is in the context. Is the context classes, or is it
entities? The term "property" distinguishes the context as involving
a process of classification. Even if there is a class containing only
one entity, the essential attribute is still a property when the
entity is considered a member of a class. "Property" makes the
class distinction, not "attribute" which is only a characteristic of
an entity.

A property is characteristic of a class of entities. Furthermore, a
property is stated in its singular form, even when there are multiple
entities in the class thus multiple attributes. For example, a
property of the class of humans is the fact of walking upright. '[I]t
is a method of identification or classification according to the
attributes which a consciousness observes in reality. This method
permits any number of classifications and cross-classifications:
one may classify things according to their shape or color or weight
or size or atomic structure,' (7) or the fact of walking upright.

>>And which I quoted already, but I could add that I am aware of a
>>certain conflict in the Objectivist realm of thinking concerning what
>>exactly Rand meant by "existing relationships." Consider this. You
>>must first methodologically *regard* entities as being in relationship
>>to one another before you can form them into units, and so this
>>relating is also methodological, the relationship held in regard is
>>not ontological.
>
>Not purely ontological, but that's different. Reality plays a crucial
>role here. You don't just make up the distinguishing characteristics
>for purposes of regarding existents as units. These distinguishing
>characteristics exist in all of the units being conceptualized, albeit
>in different measure or degree. This is a fact about the units
>themselves and would continue to exist even if human beings were no
>longer around to regard them as units.

Unfortunately for your theory, not even Rand believed that the color
red will continue existing even if nobody was around to regard it as
the color red.

>>Do you see where I'm coming from with this? Let's take for example
>>the infant from page 5 whose sensory experience is chaotic. It is
>>chaotic in the sense that the infant has yet no awareness of
>>relationships, and so this experience is entirely subjective, it
>>relates to nothing outside of a rudimentary sense of "something"
>>which is in its consciousness, there is no distinction being made
>>between internal and external. Relationships form in the mind:
>>primarily the relationship between self and object, and secondarily,
>>the relationships which hold between objects. And it is only upon
>>this mental basis that the mental idea of a unit can be formed.
>
>Relationships between or among existents are grasped, not formed or
>invented in the mind. For example, the sun would be larger and have a
>greater mass than the earth even if ther was no one around to grasp
>these relationships between the two.

Relationships are not "grasped," they are established. 'The process
of measurement is a process of integrating an unlimited scale of
knowledge to man's limited perceptual experience - a process of
making the universe knowable by bringing it within the range of man's
consciousness, by establishing its relationship to man".' (8)


--
How was chirch this morning? - Michael Gordge