humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Sat, 15 Mar 2008 23:48:19 -0700, Ken Gardner
wrote:

>Malrassic Park wrote:
>
>[...]
>
>>In the end, I reduced concept-formation to class-formation,
>>and then asked: if "we" only require one existence to form the
>>axiomatic concept, then why doesn't the same rule apply to
>>all other concepts?
>
>Because when you form a non-axiomatic concept, you do so by regarding
>the existents being conceptualized as units, i.e. as members of a
>group of two or more similar members. Similarity here means that each
>member posseses the same distinguishing characterics, but in different
>measure or degree. Regarding particular existents as units then
>enables you to form the concept, which you can then apply to every
>subsequent existent subsumed by that concept. But you cannot do this
>with the concept "existence" because that one concept literally
>subsumes everything that exists.

You're only repeating stuff everybody knows. But here's something on
the topic in ITOE which nobody seems to have noticed or just glosses
over without thinking about it:

The unit "is a method of identification or classification according to
the attributes which a consciousness observes in reality. This method
permits any number of classifications and cross-classifications: one
may classify things according to their shape or color or weight or
size or atomic structure; but the criterion of classification is not
invented, it is perceived in reality. Thus the concept "unit" is a
bridge between metaphysics and epistemology: units do not exist
qua units, what exists are things, but units are things viewed by a
consciousness in certain existing relationships." (7)

I want you to notice Rand's inclusion of a certain key term which I
obviously have taken more seriously than any of you, and that is the
word "classification." Then I want you to review the subject line of
this thread.

Eventually you should learn that Rand took classifying things for
granted just as she took everything other premise in ITOE for granted.

Classifying, or class-formation, is part of Rand's theory and it
precedes concept-formation.

What was the result of Rand merely taking classification for granted
and not looking further into the means by which the mind classifies
things? She left the door open for someone like me to critique her
very method by which she thought to form concepts.

First of all, notice that Rand agrees with me on what she calls the
criterion of classification: "one may classify things according to
their shape or color or weight or size or atomic structure."

Here's the point that Rand amazingly overlooked: we do not simply
classify things by means of their shape or color. We must first
abstract these attributes, these critieria, into properties, in order
to grant them meaning for the class of existents. A property, as a
class concept, is an attribute that holds true for every entity in the
class. An example of such a property, like the criterion of color she
mentioned in the quote, would be "redness."

Conceptualization is a method of classification. A concept is a class
of units (or alternately, members of a class of existents) defined
according to those properties regarded essential to forming the
concept.

That is Rand's answer to the problem of universals which, or so I'm
told, she didn't take seriously enough to solve. Universals aren't to
be ignored, they are essential to forming classes, and thereafter if
need be, concepts.

>>> >A class can consist of one member or even zero, for
>>> >example, if someone painted an elephant pink, and it was the only one
>>> >in the world, the only member of its class; or if there were no pink
>>> >elephants in existence, the class would be empty.
.
>>> Doesn't matter. Even if this was the only painted pink elephant on
>>> the planet, you can still REGARD it as a member of a group or two or
>>> more similar members for purposes of then conceptualizing it as a
>>> painting of a pink elephant. If someone then paints a second pink
>>> elephant, you can likewise conceptualize it as a painting of a pink
>>> elephant instead of forming a new concept to identify the second
>>> painting.
.
>>My example states that someone painted an elephant pink,
>>but It sounds like you're talking about a painting.
.
>Okay, you're right. But it doesn't change my answer. If you paint an
>elephant pink, you can still regard that pink elephant as a member of
>a group of two or more members for purposes of then forming the
>concept "pink elephant." You would then have a concept that enables
>you to identify this elephant and any subsequent pink-painted
>elephants as a pink elephant. Even if it is the only pink elephant on
>the planet and even if you later wash off the paint.

That is such a violation of Rand's Razor...

>>When you talk about regarding, as if this could take place
>>in abstraction from every other existent in one's perceptual field,
>>you're going outside Rand's theory and now you're standing on
>>your own two feet.
.
>No, I'm telling you my understanding of Rand's theory. The key
>sentence is on page 6 of ITOE: "The ability to REGARD entities as
>units is man's distinctive method of cognition, which other living
>species are unable to follow." (emphasis mine) To which I would add
>this on the next page: "units do not exist qua units, what exists are
>things, but units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain
>existing relationships."
.
>>I noticed that you used the word "group" instead of "class." In
>>Rand's theory it is a simple collection, a group based on nothing
>>like a pile of sand. ("Sand," by the way, is another mass noun.)
>>So if a "group" is generally the same idea as "class," then
>>obviously it can have one member. Whereas "group" always
>>implies at least two members.
.
>It doesn't make much difference. Conceptualization is simply a
>cognitive method of classifying existents. [See ITOE page 54.] But
>part of that method involves regarding units as members of two or more
>similar members -- for purpose of then forming the concept that
>subsumes (or classifies) that member.
.
>Why do we need to do this step? Because otherwise you would have to
>form a new concept the next time you come across an existent subsumed
>under the original concept. For example, you see a snake and form the
>concept animal. Then you see a horse. If you originally regarded the
>snake as a member of a group of two or more living entities possessing
>consciousness and locomotion, you can then subsume the horse under the
>concept "animal" as well. But if not, not. You would have to have
>one concept for the snake and a second concept for the horse, but
>without being able to integrate both of them under the concept animal.
.
>Or suppose you see a man and form the concept "man." You then see his
>brother. If you regarded the first man as a member of two or more
>living entities possessing rationality and animality, you can then
>subsume his brother under the same concept. If not, you would need
>one concept for the first man and a separate concept for his brother.
>You would violate the rule of unit economy.
.
>>But here's the point you're missing: there has to BE a group
>>of two or more similar existents.
.
>Not so. There simply needs to be a single existent (although more
>than one will do nicely as well).

Then rather than saying "regarded," Rand should have said "pretended."

What's interesting is that every unit you formed in your explanation
is already a concept and so you can take it for granted. The example
of the pink elephant, however, is more revealing, in that even if one
wanted to form a concept of the only pink elephant in the world, it
would not be necessary to "regard" it as a group of two or more pink
elephants, but only as a subset of the class "animal," a subset (or
class) containing only one member identifiable according to those
properties which render it unique.

>>> >So as a result of Rand neglecting to examine the issue of classes upon
>>> >which is genetically dependent the issue of concepts, she did not
>>> >thoroughly examine the issue of universals connected with it, assuming
>>> >the problem of universals is only an epistemological one (which it is
>>> >not; it is primarily metaphysical at its root).
.
>>> Again, this is her disagreement with Aristotle (or what she thought
>>> Aristotle's view was). She does not deny that distinguishing
>>> characteristics exist metaphysically. She does not deny that
>>> essential characteristics (the ones we use when defining concepts)
>>> exist metaphysically. But you are missing her point, which is this.
>>> The reality that exists apart from man does not mark any particular
>>> set of characteristics as essential. That is something we do as part
>>> of an epistemological process for the purpose of defining concepts.
.
>>I've said that here many times. But I've also said that it gets us
>>no closer to finding 'manness,' which may or may not be essential
>>to forming the concept 'man.'
.
>Rand would answer that "the manness" in two or more human beings is
>their distinguishing characteristics of rationality and animality,
>even though their particular measurements of these attributes may
>differ in every respect. I agree with that answer.

Rationality and animality are universals. They are properties belong
universally to a class of entities defined as "man."

>Where I may disagree is with the notion that Aristotle gave a
>different answer. I think it may depend on what translation you are
>using. I know for a fact that Rand had a different translation from
>the one that I have. Also, Mortimer Adler has written a book about
>this very subject called "Some Questions About Language." I cannot
>meaningfully distinguish his exposition of Aristotle's theory from the
>theory presented in ITOE.

All he said in the quote I gave was that if Unity were a thing
standing apart from entities (that is, as a Platonic form), then it
would be impossible to have a concept of plurality.

Kant would reply to Aristotle that if Unity were inherent to the
entity, then it would be impossible to have an a priori concept of
unity, and as a result, intellectual self-awareness, which is the
ground of all unity, would be impossible.

>>And if it's only a mental construct,
>>then there is no correspondence in reality, anymore than
>>'infinity' corresponds with something in reality. 'manness'
>>doesn't exist, as you say, "metaphysically," a term which I
>>take has some kind of Aristotelian reference.
.
>But there IS a metaphyical basis in reality. That each man possesses
>rationality and animality in SOME measure or degree is a metaphysical
>fact about every man, not a mere subjective invention of our
>consciousness. This range of rationality and animality is THE manness
>that exists in every man.

There is a huge difference between saying "each man possesses
rationality" and "each man possesses a faculty of reason." It is the
distinction between saying "each man possesses a certain quality"
and "each man possesses a faculty." Since a quality is not a quantity
it is therefore not an entity, but you and others are intent on
focusing on similarities based in measurable attributes. That's all
and good, but it's not the whole story.

Taking away the measurements does not reduce your particular
ideations of a thing down to qualities such as 'rationality,' but only
to a general concept such as 'man,' because qualities don't exist
substantially, only entities and attributes exist, the rest only forms
the content of a person's intellect.

It is the same as saying that "units do not exist qua units, what
exists are things, but units are things viewed by a consciousness in
certain existing relationships." Just so, qualities do not exist qua
qualities, what exists are attributes.

I can't identify with the rest of the Rand statement quoted there
because she sloppily contradicts herself: units do not exist, what
exists are things, but units are things...

>The general point is that in proper concept formation, your mental
>processes play an essential role. But reality also plays an essential
>role. As Rand put it, concepts are neither revealed nor invented, but
>PRODUCED by man's consciousness in accordance withe facts of reality.
>This fact is what makes properly formed concepts OBJECTIVE rather than
>intrinsic or subjective. It also happens to be how she chose the name
>Objectivism, but that's a different subject.

When you emphasize words like that, it only punctuates the fact that
Rand missed the point. If Rand was trying to provide for objectivity,
then that's not even the topic here.

And besides, to employ my own saying against me, you're preaching to
the converted regarding the role of both mind and matter in producing
these thoughts, because I have said this already many times. And I
have never said that concepts of qualities such as "rationality" are
given purely by the mind. I am saying that qualities are not to be
confused with attributes which are existents.

It's time for you to examine, and then grow beyond, the doctrine dealt
in ITOE.

>>Earlier in this discussion I resignified the metaphysical as the
>>essence of man's intellect, the properties which arise from man's
>>intellectual nature, the metaphysical concepts which originate
>>with man's nature, and further down the metaphysical hierarchy,
>>those universals which are employed in the formation of
>>specific classes, rendering properties not only common to all
>>members of a class, they are identical to each member. I then
>>stated that the idea of a universal bridges the gap between
>>metaphysics and epistemology.
.
>If I understand you correctly, I disagree.

No, really?

>The metaphysical is simply
>what exists, regardless of whether or not any human being is around to
>conceptualize it. What exists is not a property or attribute of
>anyone's intellect, whether man's or God's. Instead, we have the
>intellectual capacity to regard existences as units, which then
>enables us to conceputalize these units and thereby understand the
>world in conceptual form.

All you're really saying in the first sentence there is that Rand
simply could not give up on Aristotle's metaphysics, and you're intent
on maintaining that mistake by confusing "metaphysical" with "external
to the mind." Furthermore, you are implying that man's intellect
exists, although not metaphysically, and with neither properties nor
attributes, leaving me to wonder if you believe the intellect is
threfore a property or attribute of the brain.


Rand wrote, 'I use the word "metaphysical" to mean: that which
pertains to reality, to the nature of things, to existence.' (VOS, 14)
It's nice that she used it that way, but that's not what
"metaphysical" means.

I never said that what exists ("metaphysically," of course) is a
property or attribute of anyone's intellect. I redefined or
"relocated" the metaphysical so this isn't a problem anymore.

>>Any other metaphysics, which relocates the topic in something
>>external to man's intellectual nature, is all about studying
>>God's intellectual nature.
>
>God has nothing to do with it. Existence comes before consciousness
>-- any consciousness -- not the other way around.

Well then all I have to say is that if you're going to subscribe to
Aristotle's metaphysics to any extent, even in the watered-down manner
portrayed by Rand, then you may as well go all the way: Prime Mover.

>>I'm sure she explained the exception, but not in terms of any
>>wider theory. She explained it away by petitio, that is, by
>>appealing to the premise that axiomatic concepts are special,
>>thus an exception can be granted for them.
.
>It's easy to understand why. It would be nonsensical even to REGARD
>existence as a member of a group of two or more similar existences,
>with "existence" meaning everything that exists. This is why
>axiomatic concepts are a special case.

It would be nonsensical to have to regard a concept as a mental
integration of two or more units. The only purpose of this - which is
a term you mentioned above - is unit-economy. Concept-formation
is based on subjective need, that is, intellectual facility or
efficiency, but that is all. For example, it is far more efficient
(according to Locke's example) to name it "sand" rather than trying
to name each individual grain of sand we encounter.

>>> Rand addressed this question (using blue instead of red) in Chapter 7
>>> of ITOE. "Redness" refers to the red RANGE of colors. We know about
>>> redness because (1) objects that appear to us as red (in various
>>> shades) actually exist and (2) we are able to grasp this fact by a
>>> certain means and in a certain form (both perceptual and conceptual).
.
>>No, "red" refers to the range of colors in the red part of the
>>spectrum, 'redness' does not.
.
>I think it does. When I think of the quality or attribute "redness"
>in entities possessing it, I think of the entire range of red colors.
>A "red" object is simply an object that posseses some shade of red
>within that range.

That explanation misses the boat entirely. But I'm sure your analysis
has its ultimate origin with Rand's apparent dismissal of the problem
of universals as some kind of hoax perpetrated on the rational faculty
itself.

Another problem is the fact that Rand never bothered to explain how
the concepts "manness" or "redness" are formed.

Then there is the fact that Rand never defined class-formation, except
circularly as "classification," assuming it as a premise by petitio.
This last is most important, because class-formation is part and
parcel of the whole question of forming a concept such as "redness."
And once this issue is analyzed, it is easy to see that your statement
above is gravely mistaken in all its essentials.

And if, at this point, you or someone else asks me to explain my
analysis one more time after all the times I have explained it, I
might just have to scream. Or I could just refer you back to the
original post which started all this.

>>I know (1) and (2) already, however, it misses the boat. "Redness"
>>is a universal, there is no manness in men, and there is no
>>redness in red objects. Universals have no referents outside
>>the mind, they are concepts of method used for the purpose of
>>class-formation, and concept-formation as its species.
.
>Universals are neither in reality apart from man's mind NOR in man's
>mind apart from man. This fact is what makes them objective rather
>than intrinsic or subjective. The object in question is a particular
>shade of red, and our mind grasps the redness by recognizing that the
>object's color falls within the red range. But we don't just make all
>of this up. That range of red colors exists in the objects that exist
>apart from anyone's consciousness.

Units are neither in reality apart from man's mind NOR in man's mind
apart from [reality, not man]. I'm not claiming that universals are
substantially any different from units or concepts.

There's nothing you can say against my idea that I can't find in ITOE
to use against your counter-assertions.

As for the rest of that paragraph, I don't think you'll ever except
the idea that the color 'red' doesn't exist externally to the mind, it
is a product of perception acting upon light-waves. Otherwise, we
would not need rods and cones in the eye. They only sense that which
the brain interprets as color. But this is not known directly, it is a
scientific, conceptual discovery.

Common-sense has it that the color red exists externally to awareness,
and that is often how I use it in these discussions. But common-sense,
as usual, is naive to the findings of science.

>>> Most of our knowledge is gained and held in conceptual form. If we
>>> don't have a valid theory of concepts, we're fucked. But we do.
>
>>We don't acquire knowledge in conceptual form, we acquire
>>knowledge and then form it into concepts as need requires it.
>>Otherwise, Rand's Razor would serve no purpose.
>
>Strictly speaking, we organize percepts into concepts and thereby
>retain our knowledge of the world in conceptual form. A proper
>epistemology is about how to perform this process correctly.

See? That's what happens when you stick with only one set of doctrines
your entire life.

What is the science of epistemology?

www.msu.edu/~susse/PHL200-Glossary.html
"The branch of philosophy that investigates the possibility, origins,
nature, and extent of human knowledge."

Rand never investigated these things, she only took them for granted
and then went on to examine how concepts are formed.

http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/virtual/glossary.htm
'The study of what is meant by "knowledge". What does it mean to
"know" something as opposed to merely having an opinion. This issue
has been at the core of Western philosophy since before Socrates,
since, until it has been answered, all other questions become
unsolvable.'

That explanation relates to the problem of universals. But since Rand
only took knowledge for granted, and only examined the conceptual form
in which it was most effectively held, of course she couldn't even
touch the problem of universals or any kind of difficult question.

www.stsams.org/dictionary.html
"The philosophical discipline which examines the nature and validity
of human cognition."

And so on.

Rand stated in ITOE that a concept is a universal or an abstraction.
However, she did not state what knowledge is, or she would tend to
conflate that term with "concept."

>>As for "existence exists," Rand only assumed that as knowledge
>>as well (see the Foreword), and then proceeded to derive its
>>concept.
>
>"Existence exists" isn't merely an assumption. It is axiomatic. If
>you don't even have existence nailed down at the very beginning, there
>is no point in talking about how to gain knowledge of existence.
>
>>Yet these capacities go unexplained, the background theory
>>is missing. And that background theory is the theory of knowledge.
>>That theory explains how you have knowledge of units, and how you
>>have knowledge of measurement before omitting it.
>
>I disagree. She covers these issues in the first two chapters and (to
>some extent) Chapter 6. See especially pages 5-6.

I have seen pages 5 and 6 many, many times. Chapter 6 is the chapter
on axiomatic concepts - in which Rand commits the ultimate petitio by
merely assuming the very ground of absolutely everything.

Pages 5 and 6 only take knowledge for granted, and then delve into the
basis for concept-formation. Where does the implicit concept come
from? Reality? Rand does not tell us. What does it mean for the
concept of an existent to be "implicit in every percept"? Blank-out

The latter question is important, because it means that *one can have
conceptual knowledge before any method of forming concepts has been
employed.*

Ayn Rand was chasing her own tail.

>>> >And so the properties we designate to individuals, when these
>>> >individuals are formed into classes, become universals, but are not
>>> >thereby granted existence outside a thinking being qua universals.
.
>>> They don't exist as units or universals, but they do exist as
>>> attributes of individual concretes and differ only in their particular
>>> measurements (which we omit when we conceptualize them). This is the
>>> part that reality supplies to the concept-formation process. It is
>>> This is why valid concepts are not merely subjective. But we humans
>>> must also bring the unit perspective to the table and perform the
>>> processes that result in valid conceptualizations. This is what makes
>>> valid concepts objective, not intrinsic or "a priori." Knowledge
>>> begins with what we perceive, which we then organize into concepts,
>>> propositions, and theories in accordance with specific objective rules
>>> of concept-formation and use.
.
>>Attributes belong to individuals, properties belong to individuals
>>only insofar as we have brought them together in the form of
>>classes. Universals are properties insofar as these properties
>>are identical to all members of the class.
>
>No, the properties are there (albeit in different measurement or
>degree in individual existents) whether we have "brought them together
>in the form of classes" or not. Even if you remove all human beings
>from the planet, all the other animals that remain will still possess
>the attributes of "living," "conscious," and "locomotive."

You're not defining "property" correctly. Didn't Rand define it for
you? Isn't there a section in the Appendix to ITOE on properties?

Here's the problem with that Appendix discussion of properties: *not
one time do they bother to define their terms.* And so they wind up
conflating "property" with "attribute," treating them as synonymous.

"Property" is a class concept. It is used in the study of classes, not
entities.

Here is the difference between "property" and "attribute." An
attribute is any quality of an object which you can pick out of
perception. A property, on the other hand, is any quality of an object
which you can pick out of perception *and then use for the purpose of
forming a class.*

>>Here's what you don't understand about this theory: classes don't
>>exist anymore than concepts do.
>
>Rand's answer (and mine): "units do not exist qua units, what exists
>are things, but units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain
>existing relationships."

And which I quoted already, but I could add that I am aware of a
certain conflict in the Objectivist realm of thinking concerning what
exactly Rand meant by "existing relationships." Consider this. You
must first methodologically *regard* entities as being in relationship
to one another before you can form them into units, and so this
relating is also methodological, the relationship held in regard is
not ontological.

Do you see where I'm coming from with this? Let's take for example
the infant from page 5 whose sensory experience is chaotic. It is
chaotic in the sense that the infant has yet no awareness of
relationships, and so this experience is entirely subjective, it
relates to nothing outside of a rudimentary sense of "something"
which is in its consciousness, there is no distinction being made
between internal and external. Relationships form in the mind:
primarily the relationship between self and object, and secondarily,
the relationships which hold between objects. And it is only upon
this mental basis that the mental idea of a unit can be formed.

>>Properties are a product of
>>class-formation, they don't exist either. Universals don't exist,
>>redness doesn't exist, manness doesn't exist, a-ness doesnt
>>exist. All these universals are products of man's intellect, they
>>are concepts of method used in forming classes and concepts,
>>they are not found in reality.
>
>You have this exactly backwards. Just as Kant did. :)

Why do you have to make this discussion such a cakewalk for me?

"[U]nits do not exist qua units, what exists are things units are
things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships."

Rand had this exactly backwards. Just as Kant did. :)

-

"I am afraid that I idealize Hickman and that he
might not be this at all. In fact, he probably
isn't. But it does not make any difference. If he
isn't, he could be, and that's enough."

Journals of Ayn Rand, Feb. 1928