humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Mar 5, 6:58 pm, Charles Bell wrote:
> On Mar 5, 7:55 pm, Malrassic Park wrote:
>
> > You don't really have a good point because I brought up the context
> > in my original post, it is not mere assertion, neglecting to read it
> > is not a good excuse to respond with a counter-assertion. Of course,
> > it has to do with the problem of universals.
>
> Your arguments with respect to Objectivism consists of two types : (1)
> You assert X is real philosophy; Rand does not deal very well with X
> [This is called misdirection]; and (2) philosopher says Y, so does
> Rand, but only very poorly [This is called a lie]. This essay of
> yours this time around is of type (1). The fact is that Rand not only
> does not use "universals" but she considers them poor philosophy for
> the reasons I quoted from FNI; thus, saying that she does not deal
> very well with "universals" is a misdirection in order for you to go
> on and on and on about how Rand is a poor philosopher when the fact of
> the matter is that you do not even begin to present a common-sensical
> case that your initial assertion that "universals" have any value
> whatsoever to real philosophy as opposed to the bilge that is taught
> in academe.

I did not state that Rand was 'a poor philosopher,' but where did
she deal with the problem of universals? ITOE is the answer. "These
are the reasons why I chose to introduce you to Objectivist
epistemology by presenting my theory of concepts." Those reasons
directly involve the quote from FNI. 'They were unable to offer a
solution to the 'problem of universals'." Rand's answer is her theory
of concept-formation. Observe, and learn:

Rand wrote:
'The three persons are three individuals who differ in every
particular respect and may not possess a single identical
characteristic (not even their fingerprints). If you list all
their particular characteristics, you will not find one
representing "manness." Where is the "manness" in men?' (2)

Note that this is very close to how I characterized the problem of
universals - three individuals differ in every particular respect and
may not possess a single identical characteristic. But then she
asks, "Where is the manness in men?" And I reply, that is not
the question. Rand might say the concept 'man' essentially has
reason as its CCD. But that answer poses the same problem
as the one regarding identical characteristics including their
fingerprints. Not even reason, as a characteristic of men, is
identical from person to person, since all men reason a little
differently.

Furthermore, she has not answered the question of what
makes characteristics identical. Omitting their measurements
cannot accomplish this. The question of how knowledge of
similarity occurs was not even dealt with in a work on
epistemology. The validity of the senses was not dealt with,
although such an argument would fit nicely into the scheme of
an introduction to epistemology gathering material for judgments
comes "before" the mental judging and evaluating of the material.

You can call it 'bilge,' but Rand dealt with it very seriously, she
considered it a question of paramount importance (3), and I am
dealing with Rand's arguments not your argument that the whole
question is bilge. As long as Rand took it seriously then I will
deal with it as a question she brought up herself. And to an
extent I will use it to further my own investigations into the
question. So if you think it's all a bunch of hooey then I don't
understand why you continue to debate the question. Oh I
know, you're just defending Rand's intellectual purity, ignoring
the fact that she brought up a question which you consider
bilge, and she even answered this 'bilge' with her own theory
of concept-formation. 'These are the reasons why I chose to
introduce you to Objectivist epistemology by presenting my
theory of concepts.' Not because the problem of universals has
destroyed reason, but because reason's defenders 'were unable
to offer a solution to the 'problem of universals.' (3) And of
course,
if Rand was wrong, then she was wrong: A is A. Moreover, I won't
let myself get sidetracked into these kinds of non-productive
discussions about what is bilge and what is not especially since
Rand doesn't even agree with your complaint.

> > I'm no subjectivist "witch doctor" claiming that the universal quale
> > 'redness' comes entirely from the mind. Obviously it comes partially
> > from experience with red things.
.
> It comes wholly from the experience with red things.

...by induction, which only can speak for the limited
experience of red things, notfor all members of the class
of red things. It would be rather hard to experience every
red thing in the universe in order to properly define by induction
the class of red things. But that is what proof by induction entails.

> > However, the connection within
> > experience of the universal 'redness' with a class of red objects,
> > whatever objects you prefer, can only be made by the mind with apriori
> > concepts of its own devising.
>
> No, it does not. I agree that there is a sort of arbitrariness in
> classifying what are red things and then calling them "red things" as
> opposed to "cncncncd things" but that is an interesting linguistic-
> cultural issue, not properly a philosophical issue. Throwing in what
> is "in the mind" because of linguistic-cultural influences is
> distracting and not helpful, unless, like you, one wishes to misdirect
> the discussion. The "red things" are not "green things" and such
> classification, however done, is an epistemological manifestation of
> the Law of Identity and Non-contradiction. The fact that we now
> define "red" differently now (by an assigned range of frequencies of
> light) than we did in the time of the ancient Greeks or even decades
> ago is likewise rather an indication that your "universal" of redness
> is not quite so universal.

The problem of universals is not one of "red things are not green
things," but how red things (or green things) are identical via their
redness, a question brought up with regard to manness at ITOE (2).
If they are identical via a property held in common then they
are potentially members of the same class. Varied instances of
the color red do not bring redness, the ability to form classes
out of such properties is a product of the mind, because
classes don't exist outside the mind any more than concepts
do. Your statement about linguistic-cultural influences was
issued without a single justification, it was a mere assertion
which I don't have to take on faith any more than you have to
take my assertions on faith.

The question of redness IS a question about a universal.
Refusing to add "-ness" or even "-hood" to certain nouns and
adjectives does not make the question go away or toss it into
the linguistic dumpster. It is to say, "I don't want to discuss
philosophy with you." Whatever you want to do, but for the most
part, Rand herself did not 'discuss' philosophy, but only used it to
rationalize her "instincts." 'Reason is instincts made conscious.'
(First Philosophical Journal, 73.)

> I know that you wanted this to be mostly about "class" but you are
> incapable of discussing that subject without introducing philosophical
> folderol of universals and apriori concepts thereby stopping any
> rational discussion. I have some problem with Rand's handling of
> "class" in ITOE but it does not involve anything you have brought up.

She discussed "class" in the appendix with a so-called "prof." but
nobody there bothered to define what they were talking about. So
of course they were lost without that definition.

You assume what I want to discuss primarily. Perhaps
I brought up the 'class' issue first in order to segue into the
more basic question of universals, because my theory has
it that they are related, and I had this theory before I
started this thread.

Aristotle mentioned the metaphysical universals Being and
Unity, and I will not stop mentioning Aristotle simply because
of your assertion of your private belief that certain concepts are
"folderol." It is obvious that Rand's "instincts" varied drastically
from your own. Aristotle acquired a huge body of works and
all you want to focus in on is one tiny part, the law of
non-contradiction. But that a thing cannot be all red and all
green at the same time is not the topic of this thread. If you
understood what 'apriori' meant you would realize that
Aristotle's logic is entirely apriori to judgments. The fact that
his logic has an ontological basis only shows that Aristotle
was confused about the problem of universals. He is known
as a moderate realist because of the close relationship of his
theory to Platonic forms which is 'radical' realism. In other
words, Aristotle's ontology is watered down Platonism.
Aristotle is obviously not saying, with Plato, that the Forms
are more real than entities, he is saying that Forms are
equally as real as entities, they are on an ontological par
with each other. The Forms exist for Plato and Aristotle,
albeit in different modes of existence; they exist for Rand
as concepts.You claim they do not exist at all. I say they
exist as the form of classes, not the form of entities, of
which concepts are a species of thought. I have argued
that universals make class-formation possible. A mental
entity such as a class is not ontologically real, nor is the
form of the mental entity which involves the intellectual
act of universalizing individual attributes of entities in
reality into properties held in common by the class. Thus
the universal, or let's say, the act of universalizing, makes
the class of entities possible.

By the way, your response didn't show up in my usual reader so
I had to resort to using Google Groups. I've had to check this
site because lately my own responses haven't been showing up,
and Google shows that I doubled up on a post in this thread after
the first one didn't show up.