humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Wed, 05 Mar 2008 16:16:02 -0800, Charles Bell
wrote:

>On Mar 5, 5:59 pm, Malrassic Park wrote:
>
>> Say "no" to Platonism.
>
>Very well said.
>
>
>> Toward the end of my essay I denied it, and
>> in fact I quoted an Aristotle attack on Platonism (although I didn't
>> explicitly say that's what it was, it should be obvious from the
>> text). I agreed with the idea of attacking Platonism on his Forms,
>> that is, universals, but I disagreed with Aristotle's ontological
>> basis for doing so (as did Rand). I believe that the source of
>> universals is not physical reality, nor a supernatural dimension, it
>> is the mind.
>
>All fine and good, but I believe your universals are nothing but
>figments of your imagination (as you admit) and only real as a form of
>unreality. Pretty much everything else falls in place as an
>explanation of something which is not real. So what?
>
>>Universals are required by the mind to make rational
>> sense out of reality,
>
>No, they aren't. What do we have to go on this? Your word that it is
>true?

You don't really have a good point because I brought up the context
in my original post, it is not mere assertion, neglecting to read it
is not a good excuse to respond with a counter-assertion. Of course,
it has to do with the problem of universals.

The problem is not well worded as "Where is the manness in men?" The
question is more like "What creates knowledge of manness?" Or even,
"Where does knowledge of manness come from?" I have already argued
that it does not come from analyzing men, so you should read my first
post instead of making me waste time repeating myself here.

>> not to construct it, but just to bring order to
>> experiences as with the example of the non-empirical straight line
>> and its practical applications.
>
>So says the schizophrenic as he answers the voices to do as they say.

Psychology is irrelevant. Every time you criticize me I can criticize
your position right back because ITOE contains so highly defective a
theory. For example, "A percept is a group of sensations automatically
retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism. It is in
the form of percepts that man grasps the evidence of his senses and
apprehends reality." (5) Analyze her statements carefully, you will
find the theory known as Indirect Realism, which Rand used in order to
justify Direct Realism. Because she then goes on to say, 'When we
speak of "direct perception" or "direct awareness," we mean the
perceptual level.' (5) Talk about schizophrenic. Which is it, Direct
or Indirect Realism? Or both?

>> So while Rand believed in taking both Plato and Aristotle to task
>> on their solution to universals, Rand's theory of concept-formation
>> does nothing to add to the debate on universals.
>
>Yeah, sure, she thinks they're as real as the voices in a
>schizophrenic's head.
>
>
>> Simply asserting
>> that a concept is an abstraction or universal (1) is not a solution,
>> it merely begs the question to be answered.
>
>Sorry, I've never begged to answer a silly question.
>
>According to Objectivism, concepts are derived from the facts of
>reality. There are no "universals" -- Rand did not say words to the
>effect that "a concept is a universal."

It appears that you also forgot to read the Foreword to ITOE:
"But concepts are abstractions or universals." (1) To any sighted
person capable of reading beyond the first-grade level, that reads
"concepts are universals."

>If one wants to explain the
>voices in the schizophrenic's head or just plain, ordinary imaginary
>thought, any knowledge obtained for that purpose is by concept-
>formation from the facts of reality. The only "petitio" involved is
>in your attempt explain anything without reasoned examination of
>evidence and without concepts derived from reality but by reference to
>the very same illusory "univerals" you think you need.

You need to examine the concept of a petitio, and then recognize it in
Rand's writings. If you don't like Wikipedia, try 'The Philosopher's
Toolkit.'

If univerals are illusory, then so are concepts. "But concepts are
abstractions or universals." (1)

>> (And it's not as if nobody
>> else has thought up this kind of solution, compare the Conceptualism
>> of Peter Abelard.)
>>
>
>> Ayn Rand stated the problem of universals in this fashion:
>
>
>
>"To negate man's mind, it is the conceptual level of his consciousness
>that has to be invalidated. Under all the tortuous complexities,
>contradictions, equivocations, rationalizations of the post-
>Renaissance philosophy - the one consistent line, the fundamental that
>explains the rest, is: a concerted attack on man's conceptual faculty.
>Most philosophers did not intend to invalidate conceptual knowledge,
>but its defenders did more to destroy it than did its enemies. They
>were unable to offer a solution to the "problem of universals," that
>is: to define the nature and source of abstractions, to determine the
>relationship of concepts to perceptual data . . .

Neither was Ayn Rand. And do you solve the problem by declaring it
illusory? 'If, in the light of such "solutions," the problem might
appear to be esoteric, let me remind you that the fate of human
societies, of knowledge, of science, of progress and of every human
life, depends on it. What is at stake here is the cognitive efficacy
of man's mind.' (3)

>"The form of that absurd concession was the philosophers' ultimate
>division into two camps: those who claimed that man obtains his
>knowledge of the world by deducing it exclusively from concepts, which
>come from inside his head and am not derived from the perception of
>physical facts (the Rationalists) --- and those who claimed that man
>obtains his knowledge from experience, which was held to mean: by
>direct perception of immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts
>(the Empiricists). To put it more simply: those who joined the Witch
>Doctor, by abandoning reality--and those who clung to reality, by
>abandoning their mind."
>

I'm no subjectivist "witch doctor" claiming that the universal quale
'redness' comes entirely from the mind. Obviously it comes partially
from experience with red things. However, the connection within
experience of the universal 'redness' with a class of red objects,
whatever objects you prefer, can only be made by the mind with apriori
concepts of its own devising. I do not appeal to concept-formation,
but to class-formation, and what makes it possible. So the question
becomes, "How is knowledge of redness possible such that we are
able to classify red things?" It is made possible by the ability to
form a class in the first place, such that a class consists of members
sharing at least one common property. These properties, in reality and
as attributes of entites, are *not identical from one entity to the
next.* The reason in one man is not identical to the reason in the
next man. The red shade of one book is not identical to the red shade
of another book. Even the straight line in perception is not identical
or equal to your concept of straightness. What then brings unity to
the class of red objects? Not reality, which brings only variety and
diversity of properties.This class possesses the universal quality of
unity, which is metaphysical because it is common to all classes qua
classes. And as class theory is of the mind, its unity is of the mind;
unity is essential to making the class theory function, its support is
of the methodological kind, not ontological as with Aristotle. And if
methodology is subjective, then so are Rand's "concepts of method."

That's all I want to mention about this for now.
--
We usually go over the top w/ our new found freedoms.
Unfortunately, her 'followers' are as radical as Pat
Robertson's. Discernment goes out the window.
- A youtube poster