humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Mar 5, 7:55 pm, Malrassic Park wrote:

> You don't really have a good point because I brought up the context
> in my original post, it is not mere assertion, neglecting to read it
> is not a good excuse to respond with a counter-assertion. Of course,
> it has to do with the problem of universals.


Your arguments with respect to Objectivism consists of two types : (1)
You assert X is real philosophy; Rand does not deal very well with X
[This is called misdirection]; and (2) philosopher says Y, so does
Rand, but only very poorly [This is called a lie]. This essay of
yours this time around is of type (1). The fact is that Rand not only
does not use "universals" but she considers them poor philosophy for
the reasons I quoted from FNI; thus, saying that she does not deal
very well with "universals" is a misdirection in order for you to go
on and on and on about how Rand is a poor philosopher when the fact of
the matter is that you do not even begin to present a common-sensical
case that your initial assertion that "universals" have any value
whatsoever to real philosophy as opposed to the bilge that is taught
in academe.


> I'm no subjectivist "witch doctor" claiming that the universal quale
> 'redness' comes entirely from the mind. Obviously it comes partially
> from experience with red things.

It comes wholly from the experience with red things.

> However, the connection within
> experience of the universal 'redness' with a class of red objects,
> whatever objects you prefer, can only be made by the mind with apriori
> concepts of its own devising.

No, it does not. I agree that there is a sort of arbitrariness in
classifying what are red things and then calling them "red things" as
opposed to "cncncncd things" but that is an interesting linguistic-
cultural issue, not properly a philosophical issue. Throwing in what
is "in the mind" because of linguistic-cultural influences is
distracting and not helpful, unless, like you, one wishes to misdirect
the discussion. The "red things" are not "green things" and such
classification, however done, is an epistemological manifestation of
the Law of Identity and Non-contradiction. The fact that we now
define "red" differently now (by an assigned range of frequencies of
light) than we did in the time of the ancient Greeks or even decades
ago is likewise rather an indication that your "universal" of redness
is not quite so universal.

I know that you wanted this to be mostly about "class" but you are
incapable of discussing that subject without introducing philosophical
folderol of universals and apriori concepts thereby stopping any
rational discussion. I have some problem with Rand's handling of
"class" in ITOE but it does not involve anything you have brought up.